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by
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I.

Introduction
AAcademic performance is at tragic levels for the children of Philadelphia,
with 80 percent of the District=s children scoring below Aproficient@ in
reading and math. The human consequences of that failure are
heartbreakingB170,000 Pennsylvania boys and girls who have not
achieved proficiency in the basic skills of learning.2 A
AWe didn=t make the change from the school board to the School Reform
Commission to not get the results we need for the kids. The commission
has to be accountable.@3
AIndependent schools are public schools governed by teachers,
administrators and parents who are empowered to make decisions about
school operations, and who are held accountable for fiscal and academic
results@4
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April 9, 2002, Pa. Dept. of Education Press Release announcing award of $2
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The words empower, accountability, and failure permeate the debate over public
education. They appear repeatedly not only in media accounts 5 and in the public statements of
political figures6 but in the language of legal authority Bin court opinions,7 statutes,8 and in
academic scholarship.9 But what do these words mean? Who is being empowered? To do
what? Who is accountable to whom and for what? What is failure?
I teach law students how to identify and analyze legal problems, how to research and
apply legal authority and how to communicate their analysis orally and in writing.10 One
major theme is precisionBthey must be precise in their language and in their analysis.
They cannot say Afailure@ without defining what they mean by that term. But the law
makers of school reform do not feel the need to meet this basic requirement of good
lawyering. Instead these words are used without definition, without examination and
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Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
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without any historical context. In this article, I will examine the use and misuse of
language that has driven Athe largest school reform effort in the history of public
education@11Bthe transformation of the Philadelphia School District.12 Philadelphia in
2001 and 2002 became a key battleground where long held visions of public education as
a community value, essential to create the common citizenship necessary to the
functioning of democracy, were being confronted directly by those who view education
in individual consumer terms and firmly believe that it should be controlled by the market
and all schools should be subject to market principles in order that education can be
provided more Aefficiently.@ 13 I am not going to directly address that underlying
debateBthough it will be obvious from my own rhetoric where my sympathies lie. I have
a more limited goalBto look at how the pro-market forces use language to push for the
changes they seek, how words are used as weapons but without definition or precision
and often in contrast to the underlying reality they supposedly describe. I focus on
Philadelphia because the language of the debate here is remarkably illuminating. This
article will trace the language through the key events occurring in Philadelphia in 2001
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and 2002. I will briefly refer to the national context as well but my focus is local. The
words I focus on are Aaccountability,@ Aempowerment,@ and, most important, Afailure.@
What is a failing school? This term is bandied about by nearly everyone these daysBfrom
think tank writers devoted to the marketization of everything14 to legal scholars,15 and Supreme
Court justices.16 But what does it mean? Failing at what? Failing whom? And, if a school is
Afailing,@ what should be done about it? Who is accountable for the failure? Should we
Aempower@ the Acommunity@ to Areform@ the school? How? How does the image of failure
contrast or harmonize with legal rulings at the state and federal level that children are entitled
only to an Aadequate@ education, rather than one that is equal to those of other children in their
state?17 Finally, what do we mean when we describe a school as Agood?@18 What do we risk
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App. Div. 2002)(holding that New York provided Athe opportunity of a sound basic education@
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which plaintiffs do not dispute is being provided.@). The Appellate Division=s opinion was
recently overturned by the New York Court of Appeals which rejected this crabbed interpretation
of a Asound, basic education.@ See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 2003 WL
21468502 (June 26, 2003). In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 37 (1972), the Supreme Court similarly found that, even if Asome identifiable quantum of
education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [the right to
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losing that is Agood@ through this process of reform of our public school system? Does the
privatization and marketization of public education threaten the historic democratic ideal of the
common school?19
In mid-2001, the Philadelphia public school system became the subject of a very public
experiment in school reform. The state wrested control of the school district from the city, acting
under an agreement between then-Governor Tom Ridge and Philadelphia Mayor John Street, but
against the background of a recently enacted state law that authorized state takeover of school
districts that have budgetary problems or poor standardized test scores.20 The governor and
secretary of education for Pennsylvania repeatedly invoked dire descriptions of the academic
problems exhibited by the system as justification for their actions.21 But the terms, though
flamboyant and emotionally compelling, were rarely if ever defined, and never defined within
any historical context. This article will examine the language of the law, the law makers and the
expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit appellees= argument
might have if a State=s financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational
opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending levels are involved and
whereBas is true in the present caseBno charge fairly could be made that the system fails to
provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the
enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.@
18

Parental perception of whether a school is Agood@ seems to be, unsurprisingly,
dependent on who attends the school, rather than on its specific academic program or even its
test score success. Luis Benveniste, et al., ALL ELSE EQUAL: ARE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS
DIFFERENT? at 7 (RoutledgeFalmer NY 2003). Parents also tend to rank highly the school their
own children attend, even when they rank public schools generally as poor. Id. at 2-3.
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Many scholars have concluded this threat is real, a conclusion I share. See, e.g. Apple,
supra, note 13; Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 257 (1999).
20

24 P.S. '' 17-1701B et seq.

21

See infra, Part IV.
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advocates of market-based school reform and how it compares and contrasts to the actual
situation in the public schools of Philadelphia. Part II sets out the story itself. Part III explores
the theoretical framework of the reform movement. Part IV provides a closer examination of the
words and language employed by the reform forces and of the assumptions those words rely on.
I conclude that the rhetoric has not been honest but has been used to present an incomplete
picture of both the role of public schools and the actual experience of public education in
Philadelphia in a conscious and unconscious effort to individualize and marketize schooling in
Philadelphia, with the ultimate goal of eliminating the Apublic@ from education altogether.
II.

Chronology of a Takeover
One cannot understand the current situation in Philadelphia without understanding a bit

of history, particularly Philadelphia=s relationship to the rest of Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania has
been described as APittsburgh and Philadelphia separated by Alabama.@22 The truth of this pithy
description is that largely rural Pennsylvania does not always enjoy the city that dominates its
eastern end. Neither Pennsylvania nor Philadelphia are wealthy entities. Public education was
valued in Pennsylvania at its founding however. William Penn declared public education a
founding principle of Pennsylvania in his charter establishing the Commonwealth in 1701. The
Pennsylvania Constitution directs the General Assembly to Aprovide for the maintenance and
support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the
Commonwealth.@ 23

Philadelphia is home to the second oldest public high school in the United
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See James Carville, James Carville on Bob Casey, National Review On Line
www.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/interrogatory060100.html (accessed August 23, 2003).
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Pa. Const., Art. 3, sec. 14.
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States, Central High School.24 The financing of public education in Pennsylvania, as in many
states, relies primarily on local property taxes. This system has burdened localities, especially as
the Commonwealth=s contribution has shrunk in recent decades.25 Localities like Philadelphia
which are facing shrinking tax bases, have been especially hard hit. Philadelphians pay twice as
much of their incomes in local taxes as do residents of its surrounding, wealthier suburban
counties but, because of their more modest incomes, this burden results in less not more money.
26

This has led, inevitably, to stark contrasts in school spending. In 1999, Philadelphia spent

$7480 per student while Lower Merion, a well funded and highly regarded suburban district,
spent $13,139.27 Many of Pennsylvania=s rural and small town districts face equally difficult
funding crisesBand equally harsh budgetary realities.28
Philadelphia=s school system also lacks any authority to tax directly. It must depend on
the city=s government to raise taxes to provide any necessary funding or on the beneficence of the
state legislature. The Philadelphia School District has been operating at a deficit for years.
Public school parents and staffs are intimately familiar with the annual round of cutbacks and
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See Good Schools Pennsylvania, There is a Crisis in Public Education in Pennsylvania
(2002). The state=s share of funding for public schools shrank from 55% in 1974-75 to 35% in
2000-2001. Id.
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Germaine Ingram, Panelist, Separate But Unequal: The Status of America=s Public
Schools, Proceedings, 8 Mich J. Race and L. 249, 317 (2002).
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See Ronald Cowell, State government shortchanges Pennsylvania=s children, Press
Release, Education Policy and Leadership Center, Aug. 19, 2003.
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Education Week ranked Pennsylvania as the fourth most inequitable of the 50 states in
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fights to preserve an extra kindergarten here, a music program there. The fight has seemed
endless.
Despite the financial problems, though, Philadelphia has not ignored its schools. The
District has been struggling with reform efforts for years, most recently under the leadership of
David Hornbeck, appointed Superintendent by then-Mayor Ed Rendell in 1994. Hornbeck=s
reform effort, Children Achieving, focused on educational improvement.29 Standardized test
scores30 were rising in Philadelphia for the final years of the Hornbeck administration.31
Hornbeck largely left the looming financial crisis to others however. He took the position that
the state needed to live up to its obligation to provide adequate funding and focused his efforts
on showing that the District was making strides that deserved to be paid for. Hornbeck resigned
in 2000, following a bitter dispute with the legislature, during which he, perhaps
undiplomatically but in the opinion of many accurately, denounced the legislative refusal to
provide increased funding for Philadelphia as racist and motivated by hostility to urban
29

The reforms included provision of all-day kindergarten, smaller class size in the early
years, performance targets for each school, and expanded professional development. See
Philadelphia School District, Tell Them We Are Rising: The Philadelphia Story, 1994-1998
(1999)(copy on file with author).
30

See infra at
education.
.

for a critique of over reliance on test scores as evidence of good
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Hornbeck resigned in 2000. Standard and Poor=s evaluation of Pennsylvania schools
included Philadelphia as one of a Aselect group@ of 51 districts out of the 501 in the state that
made Asignificant annual progress in math and reading scores@ showing average annual increases
that were more than twice the average gain during 1997-2001 in the state. Standard and Poor,
The Greatest Gains: Making Consistent and Significant Improvements, A Study of Pennsylvania
Schools and Districts, 1997-2001, (Copy on file with author). See also Council of Great City
Schools, Beating the Odds II: A City by City Analysis of Student Performance and Achievement
Gaps on State Assessments, at 9-10, 21 (June 2002)((citing Philadelphia for improving math and
reading scores faster than the state average during all years of administration of the PSSA test up
to the spring of 2001)(copy on file with author).
8

communities.32 The reforms of Children Achieving, including all day kindergarten and reduced
class size in primary grades, were maintained by the District under Hornbeck=s
replacementsBacting Chief Executive Officer Philip Goldsmith and acting Chief Academic
Officer Deidre Farmbry.
The landscape changed rather dramatically in 1998 with the passage of legislation that
allows the state to take over school districts in academic or fiscal distress. This legislation,
known as Act 46 or the Education Empowerment Act,33 enabled the state to take over the
Philadelphia School District in January 2002. The course of events involved in the takeover was
complex. Philadelphia was placed on the state=s empowerment list in 2001 based on its 2000
standardized test scores.34 But in 2001 Philadelphia did not qualify for takeover under the
Empowerment Act based on academic distress.35 Instead, with the school district facing an ever
more severe fiscal crisis, Philadelphia Mayor John Street and then-Governor Tom Ridge36 cut a
deal37Bthe city would agree to the state hiring an independent evaluator to assess the school
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See Brent Staples, How Philadelphia Came Back From Collapse, N. Y. Times, A12
(July 29, 2000).
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24 P.S. '17-1701 et. seq.
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Pa. Dept. of Education Press Release, July 31, 2001.
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The Education Empowerment Act allows a district two years on the empowerment list
before it is subject to state takeover for continued academic failure. 24 P.S. ' 17-1705-B(a).
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Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, Governor Ridge resigned his post to
become the new director of homeland security. The lieutenant governor, Mark Schweiker,
became governor. Schweiker soon announced that he would not seek election and would leave
office at the end of Ridge=s term, January 2003.
37

Ridge agreed to advance the district=s share of the state funding due later in the year. In
exchange, Street agreed to seek a stay of the district=s pending equitable funding lawsuit against
the state, to commit to keep the schools open for the remainder of the school year, and to Aan
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district and recommend changes. If the city and state could not reach agreement on how to
respond to the assessment, the state would take over the school district. The key to the takeover
was the District=s financial distress not its academic woes.
After the state and city reached this agreement, the Ridge administration promptly hired
Edison Schools, Inc. to perform the assessment of the school district.38 Edison had never before
engaged in this kind of work.39 Edison, by its own description, is a corporation devoted to the
private management for profit of public schools and publically-funded charter schools.40
Nonetheless, Edison received $2.7 million to perform an assessment of the Philadelphia School
District.41 Its report, delivered on October 29, 2001, found the District in crisis with serious
budget problems, poor standardized test scores, inadequate technology, and an administration it

intensive review of the district=s educational and fiscal management.@ Pa. Dept. of Educ. Press
Release, July 31, 2001.
38

See Pa. Dept. of Educ. Press Release, Aug. 1, 2001; Governor Ridge, Press Release,
Aug. 1, 2001 (AEdison Schools knows what it takes to produce better educational results for
children, and they know how to do it within a budget.@).
39

The Department of Education=s hiring of Edison was harshly criticized by the state
Auditor General, Robert P. Casey, Jr., in an audit issued November 20, 2002. Casey=s audit
concludes that the contract itself was unnecessary, that the Department of Education did not
consider Edison=s qualifications or compare them to any other potential vendors, and that there
was Ano basis to support the Department of Education=s assessment that Edison=s fee was
reasonable.@ Press Release, Nov. 20, 2002, Auditor General Robert P. Casey,
www.auditorgen.state.pa.us. ; Robert P. Casey, A Performance Audit of the Pennsylvania
Department of Education=s Contract with Edison Schools, Inc. (Nov. 20, 2002)(on file with
author).(Casey Audit).
40

See Edison Schools, Inc.=s website at <www.edisonschools.com/home/home/cfm>
(accessed August 25, 2003).
41

Casey Audit, supra, note at

.
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deemed too big, too inexperienced, and too decentralized.42 Edison=s report recommended that it
be hired to manage the district.43

42

See Edison Schools, Inc., Report

(Oct. 29, 2001)(Edison Report)(on file with

author).
43

Edison Report, supra, note

at

.
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The initial hiring of Edison, its recommendation that it take over the district, and many
other aspects of Edison=s assessment instantly became the subject of enormous controversy in
Philadelphia.44 Noisy demonstrations, student walkouts, and law suits followed.45 Politicians
and community groups split, with some groups publicly supporting the state takeoverBmost
notably State Representative Dwight Evans and State Senator Anthony Williams.46 The

44

See, e.g. Council of Great City Schools, Strengthening the Performance of the
Philadelphia School District, Analysis and Comment (on file with author); Philadelphia School
District, Setting the Record Straight: A Comparison of Student Progress made by Edison Schools
and by the School District of Philadelphia, 1996-2001 (on file with author) (comparing
Philadelphia School District rates of improvement on PSSA and SAT-9 standardized tests for
three years showing steady average improvement, exceeding the state=s average improvement for
the PSSABgrade 5, 10 point average gain compared to 2 point average gain state-wide; grade 8,
13 point average gain compared to 2 point average gain state-wide; grade 11, 4 point average
gain compared to 1 point average gain state-wide; also citing improvements in four year
graduation rate); Mensah Dean, New nonprofit study blasts Edison=s Report, Philadelphia Daily
News, Dec. 12, 2001 (reporting critique of the Edison study by the Council for Great City
Schools, describing the Edison study as Arudimentary,@ and Afatally flawed.@) More recently, the
hiring of Edison and its performance were the subject of an audit performed by the
Commonwealth=s Auditor General Robert P. Casey, Jr.. That audit concluded that A[t]he
Pennsylvania Department of Education showed a shocking disregard for sound business
practices when it awarded a $2.7 million, no-bid contract last year to Edison Schools Inc. to
analyze the Philadelphia School District . . . .@ New Release, Auditor General of Pennsylvania,
Nov. 20, 2002. The Auditor General=s audit determined that the Edison study was unnecessary,
Edison lacked the qualifications to perform the study, the Department of Education failed to
request adequate documentation of Edison=s expenditures under the contract, and the contract
circumvented state competitive bidding requirements. Casey Audit, supra, note
at 37-48.
.
45

See, e.g., Phila. City Council, et al. v. Schweiker, et al., 2002 WL 468708 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 27, 2002) aff=d 2002 WL 1561919 (3d Cir. July 17, 2002).
46

Evans unsuccessfully ran for mayor against Street in the Democratic primary election
to succeed Mayor Ed Rendell in 1999. Williams and Evans both supported the charter school
movement and to a large extent privatization of the schools. Evans= webpage promotes school
choice, including proposed legislation he calls AThe Chance Initiative,@ a full voucher program,
which would require the Philadelphia School District to fund the transfer, including
transportation expenses, of any of its students to another public school or private school. See
www.pahouse.com/evans/chanceinitiative/ (accessed March 11, 2003). Evans=s own biography
states that he Achampioned the state=s charter school law@ and the Empowerment Act and notes
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community groups that favored the state=s position on Edison were rewarded for their loyalty
with subcontracts for Edison=s initial assessment,47 and by being proposed as appropriate
community partners for privatized schools in the Schweiker Report.48

his membership on the national board of directors of the Black Alliance for Educational Options.
See www.pahouse.com/evans/bio203/htm. The BAEO is committed to promotion of school
choice. See www.baeo.org/about/manifesto/htm. (accessed March 11, 2003). Evans=s fellow
board members include Rev. Floyd Flake, a founder of Edison Schools, and Deborah McGriff, a
high ranking Edison executive. Id. State Senator Anthony Williams is also a strong supporter of
school choice, particularly the charter school movement. See
http://www2.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/memberinfo/senate_bio.cfm?districtnumber=8 touting Sen.
Williams=s presidency of the Renaissance Advantage Charter School in 1999. Senator Williams=s
District Newsletter for Summer 2002 describes his invitation to the Bush White House for the
signing of a Presidential Proclamation of National Charter Schools Week. See
http://www.pasen.gov/members/districts/sd08/news/williamsnews802/pdf. (accessed March 11,
2003).
47

For example, Universal Companies received worked with Edison to survey
community members on school reform. Nueva Esperanza, a Latino community development
corporation which, inter alia, runs a charter school, also worked on this effort. See Universal
Companies, Voices and Experiences: A Community Outreach Report on Education Reform in
Philadelphia 2001, Appendix (on file with author)(Universal Report). Universal solicited input
in the form of a questionnaire that invited criticism of the current system. The form focused on
the performance of the District, not on reform models. It asked if the respondent agreed or
disagreed with such questions as:
A11. Philadelphia public schools prepare all students for higher education.@
A14. Class sizes are manageable.@
A18. The School District is doing all it can to prevent school dropout.[sic]@
A19. Philadelphia public schools provide students with quality educational materials,
including books and supplies.@
Id. A total of only 312 questionnaires were collected, including only 4 from students. Id. at 8,
Appendix. Universal asserts in the Appendix to the Report that Athe survey return-rate was
affected by anti-Edison, anti-privatization efforts to limit community feedback@ but it provides
no explanation of what these efforts consisted of. Id. at Appendix. Of the nine neighborhood
forums held for this outreach effort, one was at a public school, one at a city recreation center,
one at a funeral home, four were at churches and two were at charter schools. Id. at 6. Universal
also conducted focus groups with another 179 people, including only three public school parents
and 4 public school students but including 17 charter school principals and 30 public school
13

principals. Id. at 7. The report also says that Universal conducted 95 individual interviews with
Astakeholders@ but does not provide any further identification. Id. at 7.
Despite Universal=s stress on the inadequacies of the current system, the report somewhat
crankily notes that the community had other priorities:
AA persistent challenge to Universal=s community outreach work was the frequent shift in
focus by community members and special interest groups from SDP=s overall performance and
improvement opportunities to Edison=s for-profit state, track record, fiscal health, $2.7 million
no-bid contract, long-term commitment, etc. At every forum, moderators had to allow time for
people to express their opinions about Edison, privatization, and the assessment process, often
curtailing our ability to get targeted information. Stenographer recordings of neighborhood
forums readily show to what extent this distraction monopolized these meetings, sometimes
more than 50%.@
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
48

Groups supportive of Edison and privatization were rewarded in the Schweiker Report
by being proposed as community partners for the schools to be privatized, including AUniversal
Companies, Germantown Settlements (sic), Rep. Dwight Evans-related organizations, Sen.
Anthony Williams-related organizations, Nueva Esperanza, and the Coalition of Clergy.@
Schweiker Report at 9. In April 2002, six of these organizationsBNueva Esperanza, Universal
Companies, Foundations, Inc., Germantown Settlement, the West Philadelphia CoalitionBwere
awarded a total of $1,975,000 in grants to study converting 79 existing public schools to
independent status. See section IV infra.
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Governor Ridge left office in the fall of 2001 to become the head of Homeland Security
for the Bush Administration.49 His successor, Mark Schweiker, exhibited an equally deep
devotion to the concept of private management as the solution to Philadelphia=s school problems.
Governor Schweiker and Mayor Street engaged in heated negotiations over the recommendations
which ultimately led to state takeover with the acquiescence of the mayor in January 2002.50

49

See note , supra.

50

At one point in the fall, Mayor Street temporarily moved his office into the District
administration building as a symbol of his opposition to the proposed transfer of management to
Edison. As a result of the negotiations, Edison=s role as manager of the entire district was scaled
down to the role of consultant and the mayor was entitled to appoint two, rather than only one, of
the five members of the SRC. See Dept. of Ed. Press Releases, Nov. 20, 2001; Dec. 21, 2001.
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The Philadelphia School Board was replaced by the School Reform Commission,
comprising five members, three appointed by the governor and two by the mayor.51 The
negotiation process itself was complicated by a late hour legislative maneuver in October 2001
when the Republican leadership of the state senate engineered an amendment to unrelated
legislation involving loan forgiveness for student nurses.52 The amendment was introduced
and passed on October 23, 2001, without debate or even consideration by many members of the
legislature. It provided that the School Reform Commission would assume all decision making
power concerning the Philadelphia School District and that it would be largely insulated from
any change in the governorship because the commissioners= terms would extend beyond the term
of the governor who would replace Schweiker.53 The negotiations between Mayor Street and
the Governor simply gave the Mayor one additional appointee, two of the five, instead of the
original one provided for in the amendment.54

51

The Governor appointed James Nevels, a business executive as chair and James
Gallagher, President of Philadelphia University and Daniel Whelan, CEO at Verizon, as
commissioners. Mayor Street appointed two former members of the Philadelphia School
BoardBSandra Dungee-Glenn and Michael Masch. See Dep. of Ed. Press Release, Jan. 14, 2002.
52

The marked up version of SB 640, dated October 23, 2001 is available on line at
www.legis.state.pas.us/WUO1/LI/BI/BT/2001/0/SB6640P1473.htm. (Accessed Sept. 7, 2003).
For the Republican perspective on the amendment, see
www.pasenategop.comcomingup/news%20briefs/NB-PDF/2001/NB102901.pdf. (accessed Sept.
7, 2003).
53

The legislation provides that the terms of the Philadelphia School Reform
Commissioners, unlike the members of other state control boards authorized by the Education
Empowerment Act, cannot be ended except for cause. Compare 24 P.S. '6-696(b)(2) with 24
P.S.'17-1705-B: www.psea.org/article.cfm?SID=40 (Accessed Sept. 7, 2003).
54

See Press Release, Dept. of Education
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The SRC almost immediately exhibited some independence from Governor Schweiker=s
views on the direction of the reforms. The SRC resisted the governor=s pressure to turn the entire
management of the District over to Edison, and instead opted to hire a variety of consultants,
including Edison.55 In April, the SRC announced that it was naming 7056 schools as
Apartnership@ schools which would be subject to one of four reform modelsBthe named schools
would either be reconstituted, made into independent schools or charter schools, or would be
assigned to an entity outside the school district for management. The partnership schools were
selected based on their test scores on the required Pennsylvania standardized tests for 1999 and
2000Bthe SAT 9 test57 and the Pennsylvania System of Scholastic Assessment (PSSA).58 On
April 17, 2002, the SRC announced how each of the partnership schools would be assignedBto
what category and to which private manager.59 Forty-two schools were assigned to one of seven

55

See Press Release, SRC

56

Initially the SRC listed 75 schools but removed 5 of them based on test score
improvements that it had not fully fathomed when it first chose the schools for intervention. See
Susan Snyder and Martha Woodall, 75 schools targeted for possible overhaul, Philadelphia
Inquirer, A1(April 11, 2002); Susan Snyder and Martha Woodall, School Assignments,
Managers to take over 42 schools; 20 put under Edison, Philadelphia Inquirer, A1,11 (April 18,
2002).
57

In 2002-2003, Philadelphia dropped use of the SAT-9 and began using the Terra Nova
test instead. Both tests are normed standardized tests where scores are released as comparative
percentiles, ranking a particular student against all others who took the test that year.
58

The PSSA, first used in the 1995-1996 academic year, was norm-referenced through
the years relied on by the SRC in choosing the partnership schools. See infra, notes
and
accompanying text.
59

The April 17, 2002, SRC meeting had to be moved to a new location after a group of
high school student activists succeeded in blockading the District Administration building
preventing entry by the Commissioners and other employees of the District. The students told
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private managers; five were slated to become independent, four to become charter schools; and
the remaining nineteen were to be Areconstituted.@60 As of April 17, none of the Commissioners
had engaged in any direct, formal communication with any school or any parent group nor had
any Commissioner officially visited any of the schools targeted for reform61. The SRC
committed that all 70 partnership schools would get equal funding so that the experiment in
varying reform models could be fairly tested.62 It is also useful to note here that even though the
SRC and the media consistently referred to the 70 partnership schools as the Alowest-performing@
schools, that term was misleading. The SRC decided not to intervene with high schools, leaving
the news media they felt compelled to engage in civil disobedience because of their fervent
belief that privatization would hurt them and because they had not been able to meet with or
communicate with the SRC in any other way. See Martha Woodall and Susan Snyder, Protesting
students block school offices, Philadelphia Inquirer, A11 (Apr. 18, 2002).
60

AReconstitution@ has several, conflicting meanings and the SRC did not define what it
meant by the term, other than to state that the reconstituted schools would remain under the
direct management of the District. See PSN on reconstitution; Kelly C. Rozmus, Education
Reform and Education Quality: Is Reconstitution the Answer?1998 B.Y.U. Educ. & L.J. 103
(1998)(discussing reconstitution as a reform method nationally). In 1997, then-superintendent
David Hornbeck used a provision of the District=s contract with the teachers= union to
reconstitute two neighborhood high schools, Audenreid and Olney. Hornbeck proposed trading
the staffs of the two schools to foster reform, relying on the poor test scores of each school. His
effort was challenged by the union. See Editorial, When to blame the teachers, N.Y. Times, A 28
(March 27, 1997). The Education Empowerment Act says Areconstitute@ means A[t]o remove all
or a significant percentage of the administration, faculty and staff of a school and to create a new
school with new leadership and personnel as an alternative to closure of the school.@ 24 P.S.
'17-1702-B. Whatever the SRC meant by the term, it was not wholesale replacement of school
staff. Eventually, the SRC changed the designation for these schools to Arestructured@ to avoid
the controversy. See Paul Socolar, Takeover brings turmoil, uncertainty to school district, 1
(Summer 2002)(on file with author).
61

On April 25, 2002, in its first direct communication with parents of public school
students, the SRC sent a letter to the family of each student announcing the reform models. See
http://www.phila.k12.pa.us/src/ParentLetter.pdf. (accessed Sept. 7, 2003).
62

Philadelphia School Reform Commission, Guiding Principles
<www.philschK12.pa.us/guidin_principles.html> (accessed Sept. 15, 2003).
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all high schools off the partnership list even though many of the comprehensive neighborhood
high schools had test scores at or below the levels of the targeted schools.63 The SRC=s reliance
on PSSA scores also effectively exempted the District=s K-4 schools because, during the relevant
years, the PSSA was not administered to students in those grades.64
After the Commission made its decision on the schools, Commissioner Michael Masch
convinced his colleagues that they had to communicate more directly with the affected schools
and their communities. Thus, the Commissioners individually traveled out to each affected
school and met with the staff, parents and other concerned individuals over the months of May
and early June.65 These meetings were tightly orchestrated howeverBwith the bulk of the
meeting taken up by the Commissioner=s presentation to the audience and questions allowed only
by means of writing the question on an index card supplied at the meeting. At some meetings
the Commissioner present took questions directly from the audience. The responses made clear
that, even as of mid-May, the SRC had not fully determined what the reform models would
mean.

63

See Socolar, supra, note

64

Id.; Standard and Poors, The Greatest Gains, supra, note

.

65

.

See Susan Snyder, Panel to meet at schools that are to be overhauled, Philadelphia
Inquirer (May 15, 2002)<www.philly.com/mld/philly.living.education/K-12/3268552.htm>
(accessed Sept. 15, 2003).
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Two other important events occurred in this same time frame. In November 2001, the
Pennsylvania Department of Education solicited grant applications from seven community
groups to develop contracts to convert a list of 80 Philadelphia schools to independent schools.66
These grants were awarded under the Independent Schools Act67 and the awards were announced
in April, the week before the SRC announced its list of schools.68 The grantees received $25,000
per school but half of the award was contingent on the grantee providing the Department of
Education with a draft contract for converting the school to independent status.69 This entire
process was at cross purposes with the SRC process. Even though the statute gives authority
only to the local district, i.e. the SRC, to decide whether to make a school independent, the grants
required submission of a draft contract to the Department of Education which lacks any direct
authority to complete the contracts.70 The list of grantees was also remarkable in that the money,
$2 million, went, with one exception,71 only to groups that had publically supported the state=s

66

See Pa. Dept. of Educ. Request for Proposals, Nov. 7, 2001 (on file with
author)(Independent Schools RFP).
67

24 P.S. '5-502.1 et seq.

68

Pa. Dept. of Educ. Press Release, Apr. 9, 2002(on file with author).

69

See Independent Schools RFP, supra, note

70

Id.

71

at 3.

The one exception was the Laboratory School of Communications and Language, a
charter school with exceptionally good test scores. See Pa. Dept. of Ed. School Report Cards,
http://www.paprofiles.org/profiles/assessment5.asp (accessed Sept. 15, 2003) The Laboratory
School received a grant to study conversion of a school Ato be determined.@ See April 9, 2002
Press Release, supra, note at 4.
.
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side of the fight with the city the previous fall.72 And the list of schools for which grants were
awarded overlapped inconsistently with the SRC list. For example, the SRC determined that
James Alcorn Intermediate School and Norris S. Barratt Middle School would be managed by
Edison Schools, Inc. yet both were included in Universal Companies= independent schools
grant.73 Grants were awarded for study of 25 schools that were also on the SRC list and
designated by the SRC for other reforms.74

72

See Schweiker Report, supra, note 2 at 19.

73

See April 9, 2002, Press Release, supra at , and List of Partnership Schools,
Philadelphia School District (on file with author). Ironically, Universal also received an
independent schools grant to study conversion of Edwin M. Stanton Middle School and William
S. Pierce Middle School, even though Universal itself received contracts to manage these schools
from the SRC. Similarly, Foundations, Inc. received $75,000 in grants to study conversions of
Ada H. Lewis, Pastorius, and Kinsey even though the SRC had assigned all three schools to
Foundations to manage. Nueva Esperanza got $175,000 for seven schools that the SRC had
designated for its own reform process.
74

Id.
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The most important event was the annual budget process in the state legislature. The city
originally agreed to the original Edison study and to the takeover largely because of the promise
of additional state funding. Throughout the winter, there were frequently rumblings from
various state legislators who clearly did not feel bound by Schweiker=s commitment. Their
concerns were heightened by the state=s own fiscal problems which were going to force very
limited increases in school spending throughout the state. Non-Philadelphia legislators
complained about providing special benefits to Philadelphia when their own schools were
starving for funds. Governor Schweiker proudly and loudly maintained that he was committed to
providing $75 million to the Philadelphia schools and would use all his power and influence to
make sure that money was in the budget.75 Shortly before the budget was finalized the United
States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Zelman, finding that school vouchers were
constitutional even if used primarily for parochial school tuition. Much talk ensued about the
possibility that funding for vouchers would be incorporated into the budget at the expense of
spending for traditional public schools. When the dust settled on July 1, voucher funding was
not present and the $75 million for Philadelphia was. Or was it? Ten days later, on July 10,
2002, the news broke that the state=s funding came with not just strings but tensile steel chains
attached. $55 million of the appropriation could be used only for the 45 schools that the SRC
decided to place under private management.76 The SRC was also forbidden from moving any
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See Schweiker Report, p. iv, v; Press Release, Dept. of Education, Nov. 1, 2001.

76

See Editorial, Charles in Charge, Philadelphia Inquirer (July 20, 2002)
<www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/2002/07/20/news/editorial/3701246.htm> (accessed Sept. 15,
2003).
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other funds away from those schools.77 These steel chains directly conflicted with two of the
SRC=s guiding principlesBequal funding for all partnership schools and fair examination of
different reform models.78

77

Id.; Chris Brennan, State school $ allocation challenged, Philadelphia Daily News
(July 23, 2002) <www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/news/local/3716697.htm> (accessed Sept. 14,
2003).
78

See SRC Principles, supra note

.
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Two days later the landscape changed yet again as Schweiker claimed the reports of
restrictions were just a Ahuge misunderstanding@ and that the $55 million would be available to
all 70 partnership schools.79 This still left the SRC compromised in its ability to make
appropriate budget decisions for all 264 schools in the district.80 Although the Governor=s
representatives complained that critics were misguided and paranoid about a Aconspiracy@
between the administration and Edison, Edison representatives themselves acknowledged that
they had complained to the administration that they would not be able to operate the schools they
had been assigned unless they received additional funds.81 None of these communications were
shared with the SRC or those negotiating on its behalf with Edison and the other private
managers.82 The next week, the state administration, through Secretary of Education Charles
Zogby, retracted the retraction and, in writing, demanded that the SRC provide the private
managers with an additional $1500 per student above what all other schools would get83. Zogby
79

Editorial, Spread the Wealth, Philadelphia Daily News, July 15, 2002; Chris Brennan,
Republicans split over schools= $55M, Philadelphia Daily News (July 18, 2002); Martha Woodall
and Dale Mezzacappa, Schweiker clarifies use of funds for city schools, Philadelphia Inquirer B1
(July 12, 2002).
80

See Susan Snyder, Vallas: Playing field must be level, Philadelphia Inquirer B1 (July
20, 2002).
81

Edison demanded an extra $1500.00 per pupilBan interesting demand coming from the
company that claimed it could run the entire district for less money. See Edison Report, supra
note ; Chris Brennan, 45 schools to split $55M in extra funding, Philadelphia Daily News (July
9, 2002).
82

Id.

83

See Susan Snyder, Street=s office criticizes Pa.=s school-funding plan, Philadelphia
Inquirer B1 (July 23, 2002); Chris Brennan, State school $ allocation challenged, Philadelphia
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reminded the SRC that he would exercise the power granted him in the budget language to deny
the entire $55 million if his directions were not obeyed84. While the budget fight was proceeding,
the SRC hired Paul Vallas as the new CEO of the Philadelphia School District.85 Vallas,
formerly in charge of the Chicago public schools, shepherded through a compromise which
allowed the privatized schools a greater share of the state funding but not nearly as much as
Zogby and Edison had demanded.86 In the waning weeks of the summer, the schools prepared
for a new year, with much uncertainty.
III.

Who are these reformers and what do they want?

Daily News (July 23, 2002) <www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/news/local/3716697.htm>
(accessed Sept. 14, 2003).
84

The city=s response was outrage. The Philadelphia Daily News termed Zogby a Asliver
of a bureaucrat@who was Aessentially a pimp for Edison Schools,@ and urged the SRC to throw
the money back if they had to use it only in the way Zogby demanded. Editorial, State Holding
School Reform Hostage: What School Reform Commission Should Tell State: Drop Dead,
Philadelphia Daily News at 17 (July 19, 2002).
85

SRC Press Release, July 10, 2002,
<http://www.philsch.k12.pa.us/src/press_releases/ceo_release.pdf> (accessed Sept. 14, 2003).
86

Edison ended up with an extra $881 per student over the regular district budget
amount; the other private managers were awarded lessBChancellor Beacon, $803, Victory, $857,
Universal Companies, Foundations, Inc. $667, Temple University and the University of
Pennsylvania, $450. Chris Brennan, All schools to share $55M in funding, Philadelphia Daily
News (Aug. 1, 2002)
<http://www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/news/local/3776740.htm?template=contentModules/prin
tstory.jsp> (accessed Sept. 15, 2003); Vallas also ended Edison=s role as lead consultant, a
contract worth $18,000,000. Chris Brennan, Vallas kills consulting pact sought by Edison
Schools, Philadelphia Daily News (July 25, 2002)
<www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/news/local/3731056.htm> (accessed Sept. 16, 2003).
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Philadelphia is a battleground for the meaning and purpose of public educationBshould it
be viewed as an institution of community which aspires to provide a free quality education to all
children87 or should we look at the system from an individual consumerist perspective and
evaluate it based solely on what it has done or can do for a particular child or family? The issues,
the language and the fight in Philadelphia brought to life and illuminate the theories animating
the school reform movement which have been usefully described by philosopher Amy
Gutmann88 and theorist Michael Apple89.

87

I do not argue here that the public education system in general or Philadelphia=s system
in particular has succeeded in bringing this aspiration to reality. Public education reflects the
social and class divisions of society and suffers from insufficient support, both financial and
societal, and from deep inequities between districts that thwart its aspirations. I do not argue that
Philadelphia has no need for improvement and is meeting the needs of all of its students now.
My purpose is to argue for an honest and historically aware evaluation of how the district is
meeting those aspirations and an honest evaluation of what public education is supposed to
mean.
88

Gutmann has written extensively on morality, ethics and democracy. See, e.g. Amy
Gutmann and Anthony Appiah, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE
(Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION(Princeton, N.J.Princeton University
Press, 1987, 2d ed. 2003); Amy Gutmann, LIBERAL EQUALITY (New York and London:
Cambridge University Press, 1980); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, ETHICS AND
POLITICS: CASES AND COMMENTS (Chicago, Ill.: Nelson-Hall, 1984, 3d ed.1997).
89

Michael W. Apple is John Bascom Professor of Curriculum and Instruction and
Educational Policy Studies at the University of Wisconsin. He has written extensively on the
relationship between culture and power in education. See, e.g., CULTURAL POLITICS AND
EDUCATION (New York: Teachers College Press, 1996); EDUCATING THE "RIGHT" W AY:
MARKETS, STANDARDS, GOD AND INEQUALITY (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2001);
EDUCATION AND POWER (New York: Routledge, 2d ed.1995); IDEOLOGY AND CURRICULUM
(New York: Routledge, 2d ed., 1990); OFFICIAL KNOWLEDGE: DEMOCRATIC KNOWLEDGE IN
A CONSERVATIVE AGE (New York: Routledge, 2000).
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Amy Gutmann defined three competing normative theories of education which animate
the competing forces pushing education reform.90 The Afamily state@ model puts control of
education in the hands of the state;91 the Astate of families,@ in contrast, entrusts educational
authority exclusively to parents.92 The third competing vision, the state of individuals,
Amaximizes future choice without prejudicing children towards any controversial conception of
the good life.@93 The story of school reform in Philadelphia shows that the rhetoric of reform,
especially the use of empowerment as a putative goal, evokes the states of families and
individuals, but the reality of the reforms themselvesBthe insistence that failure is widespread
and can only be addressed by accountability in the form of state control and high-stakes
standardized testsBfirmly invokes the family state.94

90

Gutmann, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION, supra, note , at 22 (hereafter Gutmann).

91

AThe defining feature of the family state is that it claims exclusive educational
authority as a means of establishing a harmonyBone might say a constitutive relationBbetween
individual and social good based on knowledge. Defenders of the family state expect to create a
level of like-mindedness and camaraderie among citizens that most of us expect to find only
within families (and now perhaps not even there).@ Id. at 23.
92

Id. at 28. Barbara Woodhouse argues that the foundational Constitutional cases on
family law and parental rightsBMeyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)--represent Athe constitutionalization of a parental right to control
children=s education [which] perpetuated a view of the child as parental property and of
education of the child as a private good rather than as a fundamental right of the child or a
fundamental responsibility of the community.@ Barbara Woodhouse, Speaking Truth to Power:
Challenging the Power of Parents to Control the Education of Their Own, 11 Cornell J. L. &
Pub. Pol=y 481, 482 (2002).
93

The state of individuals focuses primarily on the individual learning needs of
individual children, with the goal of advancement in material terms but without imposing a
particular value system. Gutmann, supra, note at 34.
94

Gutmann critiques and rejects all three in favor of a vision of democratic education that
offers shared authority between the state, education professionals, and the family, Aconscious
social reproduction in its most inclusive form. Unlike a state of families, a democratic state
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recognizes the value of professional authority in enabling children to appreciate and evaluate
ways of life other than those favored by their families. Unlike the state of individuals, a
democratic state recognizes the value of political education to predispose children to accept ways
consistent with sharing the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in a democratic society. A
democratic state is therefore committed to allocating educational authority in such a way as to
provide its members with an education adequate to participating in democratic politics, to
choosing among (a limited range of) good lives, and to sharing in the several subcommunities,
such as families that impart identity to the lives of its citizens.@ Id. at 42.
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Michael Apple more recently analyzed the main threads of the movement for
privatization of schools, which he terms Aconservative modernization,@ and categorized them as
neoliberal, neoconservative, and authoritarian populism.95 Although the purposes of
categorization differ for Gutmann and Apple,96 the overlap between them provides an
enormously helpful framework for understanding both the rhetoric and the reality of the
Philadelphia reform forces. Apple=s categories largely echo the three philosophies Gutmann
identified. The authoritarian populists, based in the fundamentalist Christian right, adhere quite
directly to the philosophy of the state of families, advocating that educational authority be

95

Apple, supra note 13 at 28-29.

96

Gutmann=s goal is to develop a philosophy of democratic education. She is developing
a useful theory of moral education that will allow evaluation of policy: AThe primary aim of a
democratic theory of education is not to offer solutions to all the problems plaguing our
educational institutions, but to consider ways of resolving those problems that are compatible
with a commitment to democratic values. A democratic theory of education provides principles
that, in the face of our social disagreements, help us judge (a) who should have authority to make
decisions about educations, and (b) what the moral boundaries of that authority are.@ Gutmann,
supra, note at 11. Gutmann=s democratic state may, indeed should, educate to predispose
children towards Aidentification with and participation in the good of their family and the politics
of their society.@ Id. at 43. But with two major constraints or limits on the state and the
familyCnonrepressionBwhich Aprevents the state, and any group within it, from using education
to restrict rational deliberation of competing conceptions of the good life and the good society,@
id. at 44, and nondiscrimination, which demands that A[n]o educable child may be excluded from
an education adequate to participating in the political processes that structure choice among good
lives.@ Id. at 45. The commitment to this vision of democratic education is absent from the
rhetoric and theory of all three threads of reformers. Martha Minow analyzed these waves of
reformers as pushing choice as the panacea in replacement of the push for equity that animated
inclusion reformers who sought integration of all races and genders and inclusion of children
with special needs.. See Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 257,
263 (1999). Apple=s explicit goal is to understand the forces of privatization to more effectively
counter them, and to more fully understand the real limitations of current educational practices
that have contributed to the support for privatization. Apple, supra, note 13 at 8-9, 95.
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financed by the state but controlled by parents97. The neoconservatives yearn for a romantic,
idealized past where the state both controlled education and ensured that it uniformly promoted
the values of patriotism, morality, and Western traditions, echoing Gutmann=s family state.98
The neoliberals are not quite such a neat apparent fit with the state of individuals which Gutmann
identified primarily with moral neutrality. Yet, at heart they areBtheir principle is the market, a
neutral market that will effectively, efficientlyBand neutrallyBsort and educate children, if only it
is left to operate with minimum interference.99

97

Apple, supra, note 13 at 53-57.

98

As Apple points out, this romanticized past ignores not only the past battles over
curriculum but also discounts the past of much of the population of the United States. Apple,
supra, note 13 at 49.
99

Apple, supra, note 13 at 38-47.
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Apple identifies a fourth important element of the forces advocating for Aradical
restructuring@ of educationBthe technical support of a managerial class.100 Apple analyzes the
mutual interests that have brought these forces into alliance and the tensions that threaten to
disrupt their cooperation.101 The family state/neoconservative demand for uniform standards,
curricula and, above all, standardized testing to evaluate schools= effectiveness at achieving the
standards, functions to justify the imposition of market and consumer choiceBeven though the
market notion is grounded in arguments that a proliferation of types of schools and pedagogies
will be the beneficial result of market-based schooling.102 The tension between uniformity and
variety is analogous to the tension between the neoconservative desire to impose a national
vision of education on all schools with the authoritarian populist effort to separate the state
completely from educational authority by placing all funding in the hands of parents who will
then be able to use public money to fund education compatible with their personal and religious
values.103 The authoritarian aspect of this movement may falter if and when such public funding
is available but is not restricted to those schools that comport with the vision and values of the
Christian right. Will they support the right of fundamentalist Muslim parents to use public
money to educate their children in the tenets of their religion?104
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Apple, supra, note 13 at 57-59.

101

Apple, supra, note 13 at 59-62.
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This conclusion is at the heart of Chubb and Moe=s insistence that total privatization of
primary and secondary education in the United States is the panacea that will cure all of public
education=s ills. Chubb and Moe, supra, note 13 at 217.
103

Compare Gutmann, supra, note at 28 with Apple, supra, note 13 at 16.

104

The school profiles section of the Pennsylvania Department of Education website
identifies at least three Muslim schools in Philadelphia with a total of 260 students in 2000-2001,
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the Al Aqsa School, Muhammad=s Islamic Academy, and the Quba Institute of Arabic and
Islamic Studies. See http://www.paprofiles.org/pa0001/Philadelphia.htm#226510132 (Accessed
March 11, 2003). The profiles do not include the curriculum or any information as to the level of
religious rigor of the schools.
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The Philadelphia story presents a weird but, under Apple=s analysis, predictable
conflation. The rhetoric is grounded primarily in Gutmann=s states of families and of individuals
but the reality is firmly the family state. To use Apple=s terms, the reform forces use the rhetoric
of choice and parental empowerment dear to the authoritarian populists and the privateers but the
reforms themselves have been imposed with minimal choice or input by parents, students or
teachers and the market has been imposed by the state not chosen by any parent or student105.
Instead the changes have been dictated by the neoconservative state bureaucracy, guided by an
unquestioned belief in the value of uniformity and high-stakes standardized testing.106 All of this
has been enabled and supported by the managerial class that depends on the standards and testing
movement for its employment and validity.107 The reform forces have occasionally paid lipservice to some of the ideals of the democratic state theory proposed by Gutmann but have never
taken seriously the most essential aspects of her theoryBthat parents and the state share
educational authority and that authority be committed to providing a nonrepressive, nonexclusive
education adequate to allow all educable children to participate.108

105

See Part II, supra describing the lack of communication the SRC had with parents.

106

See Part IV, infra, at

.
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Edison describes itself as A[t]he nation=s leading partner with public schools and
school districts, focused on raising student achievement through its research based school design,
uniquely aligned assessment systems, interactive professional development, integrated use of
technology and other proven program features.@ <www.edisonschools.com/home/home/cfm>
(accessed August 25, 2003).
108

See Part IV. C. infra.
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The impetus for change in Philadelphia is grounded in several unquestioned
assumptionsBthat the public schools are failing;109 that drastic intervention is necessary and riskfree110; and that those who are most involved in the current system as administrators, teachers,
students and parents cannot be trusted because they are defenders of the status quo.111 The state
officials who imposed change on Philadelphia asserted they were acting in the interests of the
children and parents of the cityBbut they had no interest in communicating with the actual people

109

For example, James Nevels, the chair of the School Reform Commission appointed
to run the Philadelphia School District, stated: AI took this job because I believed there was room
for success. I believed that [the schools] could not get worse.@ Martha Woodall, His year at the
heart of city=s schools, Philadelphia Inquirer, B1, 4 (Dec. 22, 2002). Edison=s Report to the
Governor concludes, A[t]his is a critical time for the children, parents, and the community of
Philadelphia. The school system, having miseducated most of its students for many years, is
now teetering at the edge of financial failure.@ Edison Report, supra note
at 75.
110

Edison asserted that A[t]he risk of not implementing the proposed change is too great.
Philadelphia students deserve a quality education, and they deserve to have a system of
accountability, checking the effectiveness of those who control their education.@ Edison Schools,
Myth vs. Facts, website. The Athings can=t get worse@ argument and its near-twin Athings are so
bad that change of any kind can=t hurt@ both ignore the history of public education. As Molly
O=Brien has demonstrated, the United States has only recently begun to attempt to seriously
effectuate the goal of inclusive education for all, including children of color (Brown 1954),
children with special needs (1975), non-English speaking children (1988). Molly Townes
O=Brien, Questioning the Power of Consumerism to Reform Public Education, 75 St. John=s L.
Rev. 233, 242-44 (2001)(O=Brien, Questioning the Power). These relatively recent efforts are
endangered by the voucher and privatization movements that are grounded in market efficiency
and parent/consumer choice instead of the inclusive goal of equity and quality education for all
children. Id.; Minow, supra, note
at 264.
111

This position is easy to understand when it aims at those whose livelihoods depend on
the current systemBthough it denigrates their experience and expertise. It may be more puzzling
that I include parentsBbut, as will be demonstrated in part IV. C., the choice forces have very
little interest in the views of current public school parents. The Center for Education Reform
goes so far as to call them cheerleaders for the status quo. See <http://edreform.com/> . Wilbur
Rich refers to a Apublic school cartel (PSC) made up of administrators, school activists, and
teacher union leaders@ but does not define school activist. Wilbur Rich, Putting Black Kids into
a Trick Bag: Anatomizing the Inner City Public School Reform, 8 Mich. J. Race and L. 159, 181
(2002).
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affected by their decisions.112 They asserted the value of empowerment through parental choice
and local control while insisting that Philadelphia accept state and federally mandated standards,
particular testing regimes and management by private profit-making entities who, by definition,
owe their greatest allegiance not to the families in their schools but the shareholders in their
corporations.

112

In my role as a concerned parent, I wrote to Governor Schweiker and to Secretary
Zogby four times about the reform process and its impact on my children=s schools. Neither
official answered any of these letters or even acknowledged them. Copies are on file with the
author. As was detailed above, the members of the School Reform Commission, which took
control of the Philadelphia School District, never visited the schools they targeted for
intervention until after they selected them. Even the official community outreach effort that was
part of the assessment of the school district performed by Edison, Inc. in the fall of 2001,
managed to conduct only one parent focus group which had only three parents and one with
students that included only eight of them. Universal Report, supra, note at 7.
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Michael Apple=s analysis of the pro-choice forces effectively explains the dissonance
between the rhetoric and the realityBthe choice rhetoric itself is dependent on the development of
Astandards@ to enable the consumers to choose.113 We have to have Aobjective@ criteria to use the
marketBso the reality of the family state is a necessary precursor to justify the market approach to
education.114 The adherents of the state of families accept this compromise to enhance the
113

See Apple, supra, note

at 59-60.

114

The No Child Left Behind legislation illustrates the role of standards in the road to
Achoice@ in its perverse requirement that offers the illusion of choice to children enrolled in
schools labeled Afailing@ based solely on test scores. The schools must notify all students that
they have a right to transfer to a higher performing school in the same districtBbut the law
provides no funding other than transportation, no obligation on higher performing districts to
take children from struggling ones, and no concern for the destructive impact on functioning
schools which will face overcrowding from the potential influx of students entitled to transfer.
See 20 U.S.C. ' 6316. The Department of Education issued regulations implementing the
transfer provision which preclude the Afailing@ districts from asserting a lack of space in their
performing schools. 34 C.F.R. ' 200.32, 200.44. Failing districts will now be obligated to find
room somehowBeven if that means purchasing space at a presumably high premium from other
districts or overcrowding their performing schools. 34 C.F.R. '200.44(h)(1)(if a district has no
schools that are not identified as in need of improvement or subject to even higher sanctions,
then the district Amust, to the extent practicable, establish a cooperative agreement for a transfer
with one or more other [districts] in the area.@). Undersecretary for Education Eugene Hickok
explained that this requirement is intended to make Apublic school choice . . . become part of the
culture of American public education.@ Eugene Hickok quoted in Ellen R. Delisio, No Child Left
Behind Picks Up Steam, Education World, www.education_world.com/a_issues/issues371.shtml
(accessed Sept. 8, 2003). Undersecretary Hickok goes on to suggest that Adistricts that currently
have capacity challenges can create opportunities to meet those challenges. In New York City,
for example, the possibility of charter schools looms large. The possibility of cyber schools . .
.looms large.@ Id.
It does not take a genius to see the pressure for vouchers or other roads out of the public
system that these regulations will impose on a district like Philadelphia which has relatively few
schools not labeled as failing under NCLB. The labels are particularly harsh because they can be
imposed for failure to show improvement every year for every subgroup within the school,
including white, African-American, Latino, Asian-American, and Native American students,
students for whom English is not a first language, and special education students. 20 U.S.C. '
6311(b)(2); 20 C.F.R.'200.13(a)(7)(ii). Pennsylvania required schools to have 35% of their
students at proficient or above on math and 45% in reading in 2002. It identified 884 public
36

possibility of getting funding for their schools or for home schooling options, even though the
emphasis on state control has actually reduced choice and reduces parental input on the
curriculum mandated at ever higher levels of government.115
IV.

The Rhetoric of Reform

A.

The Rhetoric of Failure

schoolsBboth traditional and charterBwhich failed to meet that standard, including 29 of 39
charter schools and 209 of the 264 traditional public schools. See Schools Are Warned,
Philadelphia Inquirer, B16, Jan. 3, 2003. The rates of improvement must be constantBa big gain
in one year will not save a school from the failure label the next year if a subgroup experiences a
decline. See, e.g. Sam Dillon, Thousands of Schools May Run Afoul of New Law, New York
Times, A33, Feb. 16, 2003; Michael Winerip, Defining Success in Narrow Terms, New York
Times, B7, Feb. 19, 2003. Indeed, when the 2002-2003 scores came out for Pennsylvania, over
half the schools in the Commonwealth were labelled as failing to meet Aadequate yearly
progress@ under the No Child Left Behind criteria. Dale Mezzacappa et al, Pa. schools missing
federal goals, Philadelphia Inquirer, A1 (Aug. 13, 2003).
115

Neither No Child Left Behind nor the Empowerment Act mandate a particular
curriculum but both stress the importance of aligning curricula with the mandated assessments.
The pressure to improve test scores which is spurred by the sanction provisions of both Acts will
foster use of curricula that teach to the test. See, e.g. Alfie Kohn, THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN
DESERVE at 73-112 (N.Y. Houghton Mifflin 1999).
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The assertion that public education is failing is a necessary underpinning to the theories
of all three threads of the school reform movement. The state of families vision is grounded in a
belief that loosening of traditional values and experimentation run amok have led to the failure of
current public schools and must be reigned in by centralization and a return to traditional
values.116 The state of families adherents also rely on failure to justify their demand that control
over education be placed in the hands of parents who will then be able to correct these failures by
using public funds to pay for parent-directed education.117 The market/choice forces and
managers who facilitate and implement choice reforms depend on the failure of the current
system to justify their calls for wholesale change in the fundamental structure of how education
is provided.118 The rhetoric of the Philadelphia reform process illustrates this need to see schools
as failing and to define failure very narrowly, if it is defined at all. Most of the assertions of
failure do not even bother to attempt to define what the term means.
The proponents of the state takeover universally assert that the Philadelphia public
schools are failing. Kenneth Gamble, president of Universal Companies and an early supporter
of Edison=s role in Philadelphia, proclaimed:
America has developed separate and unequal societies. Within our urban
communities, which are predominantly African American and
Hispanic, there are disproportionate levels of unemployment, teen
families, poor health and a failing education system that will only
reinforce and further deteriorate the overall sub-par economic and
social conditions facing our communities. These conditions can
only be addressed with strong community leadership in a
116

See Apple, supra, note 13; Richard Rothstein, THE WAY WE WERE? (Centyr
Foundation 1998).
117

Gutmann, supra, note .

118

Chubb and Moe, supra, note .
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partnership with government. Collectively and individually, we
stand ready in taking responsibility in the education of our
children. We will succeed where everyone else has failed.119

This group went on to state:
Philadelphia=s educational crisis has created an unprecedented opportunity for
community organization and parents to vigorously and cooperatively pursue true
education reform. This coalition of organization, embracing practically every
area of the city, collectively and individually, is committed to dramatic change in
public education giving our children a real chance to compete and to succeed. We
are resolved to take a giant step forward, pledge to never returning to the status
quo of today. 120

119

Press release, October 31, 2001, Groups represented: Universal Companies,
Community Connections, West Philadelphia Coalition (Lee Tolbert and Lana Watkins),
Overbrook Coalition (Gail Hawkins- Bush), Neighborhood School Network (Kimberly Turner),
Germantown Settlement, Nueva Esperanza, BAEO (Keisha Hegaman).
120

Id.
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Media coverage of the reform process nearly always described the Philadelphia schools
as Afailing@,121 Astruggling@122 or Atroubled.@123 A strident but typical example is the Associated
Press headline, APhilly Schools Failing Academically@ over a story that begins: AThe math and
reading skills of Philadelphia students have sunk to >tragic levels,= with 80 percent failing

121

See, e.g. Erika Niedowski, Woes growing, educator=s fate in the balance, The
Baltimore Sun 1A (Sept. 28, 2002) 2002 WL 100129740, AEdison faces one of its most
important B and difficultBtest: the transformation of 20 failing schools in Philadelphia.@ AClearly
Philadelphia=s public schoolsystem is failing its students. Only 12% of the city =s students
perform at a >proficient= level on state tests, and more than half are essentially failing reading and
math.@ The Wall Street Journal, Review and Outlook, Editorial, 2001 WL-WSJ 2873279 (Aug.
21, 2001). See also, Rebecca Winters, The Philadelphia Experiment, Time Magazine 64 (Oct.
21, 2002) 2002 WL 21960222 (2002); Sarah Schmidt, Privatizing the classroom, National pOst
A16 (2001 WL 31022029 (Nov. 29, 2001); Sally C. Pipes, Kids com last, Investor=s Business
Daily A20 (Dec. 6, 2001).
122

See, e.g. National Public Radio, Morning Edition, Philadelphia turning struggling
schools over to private hands, 2002 WL 3189196 (August 19, 2002).
123

The media emphasis on failure continues to infect coverage of public education in
Philadelphia. In the summer of 2003, two sets of standardized test scores from the 2002-2003
school year were releasedBthe Terra Nova, administered in September 2002 and again in May
2003 to grades 3 through 10; and the PSSA, administered in April 2003 to grades 3, 5, 8, and 11.
The Philadelphia public schools showed gains in scores on both tests. The headlines and
placement in the Philadelphia Inquirer of the stories about these results are curious however.
The headline for the story about the Terra Nova results read: ATest results show progress in
schools;@ the story appeared on the first page of the second section of the paper. See
Philadelphia Inquirer, June 19, 2003, Section B1. The headline for the general story on the
PSSA results read: AReport shows big gains on PSSA test in region;@ accompanying a story
placed in the lower left corner of the front page. Philadelphia Inquirer, August 20, 2003, A1. A
specific story on the high test performance of the restructured schools, those being reformed
directly by the Philadelphia School District instead of being switched to private management, ran
on the first page of the second section under the headline: A>Restructured= schools shine on test:
The overhauled Phila. schools showed greater improvement on PSSA exams than charters or
privately managed sites.@ Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 21, 2003, B1. But the story that got placed
on the top of the front page had the banner headline: APa. schools missing federal goals: More
than half aren=t gaining fast enough for all students to be proficient in reading and math by 2014,
as required.@ Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 13, 2003, A1. Once again, Afailure@ commanded the
lead position.
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standardized tests, according to a governor=s report that recommended privatizing the school
district.@.124 These stories typically use test scores alone or test scores and reported incidents of
violence as the sole basis for characterizing a school as failing.125

124

Michael Rubinkam, Philly Schools Failing Academically, Associated Press (2001
WL 29789984 Nov. 2, 2001). The Los Angeles Times echoed the 80 % Afailure@ rate, a figure
that includes all students who achieved ABasic@ on the PSSAs. See 2001 WL 28925754 (Nov. 3,
2001).
125

They have powerful company in using these qualities as the basis for failure. The
statement of purpose for the No Child Left Behind asserts that the legislation is intended to hold
schools Aaccountable for improving the academic achievement of all students, and identifying
and turning around low-performing schools that have failed to provide a high-quality education
to their students, while providing alternatives to students in such schools to enable the students to
receive a high-quality education.@ Section 6301(4). Annual yearly progress under No Child Left
Behind is measured solely by test scores, that is Aa set of high-quality, yearly student academic
assessments . . . that will be used as the primary means of determining the yearly performance of
the State and of each local educational agency and school in the state . . . .@ Section
6311(b)(3)(A). The state must use at least one other indicator which may be an additional test,
grade retention rates, attendance rates, or rates of students completed gifted, or other accelerated
programs. 34 C.F.R. ' 200.19(b)(1)-(4). However, these additional indicators may be used only
to identify more schools as in need of improvement, corrective action, or restructuring. 34
C.F.R. '200.19(e)(2). They many not be used to remove schools from the sanction list except in
one limited circumstanceBa school that misses the annual yearly progress goal for a sub-group
can avoid sanctions if it had at least 10 % fewer students in that sub-group rank at below
proficient and that sub-group made progress on one of the additional indicators. 34 C.F.R.
'200.20(b)(1)-(2).
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The most striking aspect of the language used by both the governorsBRidge and
SchweikerBis how insistent they were that the entire Philadelphia School District was failing and
how much they also equated excellence with choice and privatization of schools. On October 24,
2001, newly sworn in Governor Schweiker told the Philadelphia Bar Association: AFor-profit
companies are not the enemy. Failure is the enemy. I have no time for those who prefer a
publicly operated school that fails, to a privately operated school that serves them well.@126.
Both Tom Ridge and Mark Schweiker were consistent supporters of private management
of schools while governor.127 Schweiker, for example, hailed the Zelman decision as Aan
126

Robert C. Johnston, Legislature signals probable takeover of Phila. schools,
Education Week 1, Oct. 31, 2001, 2001 WL 12047111.
127

The centerpiece of Ridge=s education program as governor was the effort to bring a
voucher program to Pennsylvania. That effort failed. As a backup, Ridge strongly supported
choice in the form of charter schools, praised as one of the most effective in the nation by
supporters of school choice. See Center for Education Reform website See
<http://edreform.com/> (accessed Sept. 16, 2003). Philadelphia itself had 39 charter schools in
2001-2002 with four new charter schools scheduled to open in September 2002, and three
existing public schools to then became charter schools as part of the SRC reform process. When
Ridge signed the legislation that authorized converting public schools to independent status,
funds for tutoring, and tax credits for corporations providing school choice scholarships, he said,
AI couldn=t wait to sign this bill. It includes some of the most dramatic education reforms
Pennsylvania or the nation has ever seenBreforms that will launch the most concerted effort ever
to rescue elementary school students in academic perilBwhile improving education across the
board for all our kids.@ Press Release, Governor=s Office, May 17, 2001.
It is a little hard to know what he supported before given his rather limited public career.
In keeping with a Pennsylvania tradition, his success at state-wide political office is widely
attributed to the fact that he shares a name with a very well known Pennsylvania political figure,
former United States Senator Richard Schweiker. They are, however, merely distant cousins.
Pennsylvania has three times elected men named Robert Casey to statewide elective officeBbut
only one of them was the recent governor, Robert Casey. The others just shared his name. See
G. Terry Madonna, The Pennsylvania Brand Name Game, Millersville University Center for
Politics and Public Affairs, May 8, 2001
<http://muweb.millersville.edu/~politics/many82001.htm> (accessed Aug. 23, 2003). The
Schweiker Report demands that Philadelphia be managed by an entity Aexpert in the challenges
of urban education, while thriving in a private-sector environment where compensation and
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extraordinary victory for children and parents everywhere . . . [E]ducation tax dollars should
follow children to their school of choice. When we create a vibrant marketplace of educational
providers, competition will force improvement.@128

continued employment are dependent on results.@ Schweiker Report, supra, note 2, Executive
Summary at v.
128

Press Release, Governor=s Office, June 27, 2002.
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Schweiker issued his own report in response to the Edison evaluation, which began with
ten principles of education reform, including an explicit commitment to charter school.129
Schweiker=s report accepted as true Edison=s assessment of the Philadelphia School District,
despite the highly contested nature of that evaluation.130 In both his principles and his specific
129

Governor Schweiker=s ten principles were:
1.
Educational greatness. Reform cannot be just another exercise in plugging a
budget hole, or delaying a problem. Our goal is to make Philadelphia a great
urban school district.
2.
Any new public money must go to improve education. More money for the same
results is unacceptable. New investments to improve education must first be
focused on children in Philadelphia=s lowest- performing schools
3.
We must be relentless in ensuring that public money goes into the classroom. To
do so, we must attack inefficient or nonessential spending with vigorBincluding
significantly streamlining and refocusing the District=s central administration.
4.
Any reform plan must value teachers and invest in their professional
development.
5.
Special-needs children must be protected. No effort to improve education can
leave them behind.
6.
High-performing schools in the district also must be protected. Efforts to improve
education will not be successful if they come at the expense of the Philadelphia
Schools that are already working well.
7.
Any reform plan must include a strong central school management system that
clearly and publicly identifies the academic performance expected of every
school; that insists upon proven educational programs to achieve those results;
and that articulates clear, community-supported accountability measures.
8.
Whenever possible, reform should be a vehicle to empower the Philadelphia
community to take charge of its schools.
9.
Continuity is essential. There must be a long-term, multi-year commitment to a
single reform plan. The plan must be based on proven educational programs, and
a realistic budget, with revenues the District actually can achieve.
10.
Charter schools must be valued in any reform plan. Any effort to control the
district=s charter-school costs must be grounded in the fact that charter schools are
providing some of the most exciting educational options available to Philadelphia
parents.
Schweiker Report, supra, note 2.

130

See Council of Great City Schools, Analysis and Comment; supra, note ; Setting
the Record Straight, supra, note ; Casey Audit.
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recommendations, Schweiker accepted, without question, several of Edison=s most contested
conclusions about the DistrictBincluding that Philadelphia had more teaching staff than
necessary, that it spent less per pupil in its lowest-performing schools,131 and that it should be
managed by a private entity.132
Both Edison and Schweiker concluded that the Philadelphia School District was an
academic catastrophe. Schweiker=s key conclusion was that Aacademic performance is at tragic
levels for the children of Philadelphia, with 80 percent of the District=s children scoring below
>proficient= in reading and math. The human consequences of that failure are
heartbreakingB170,000 Pennsylvania boys and girls who have not achieved proficiency in the
basic skills of learning. Worse, there are some 140,000 children who are failing reading and
math outright. This is not an >issue= or an >challenge.= It is a full-fledged crisis. We are
hemorrhaging children=s futures.@ 133
There are two significant problems with this assessment. It lacks any historical
perspective, including complete inattention to the gains that Philadelphia had made in the
previous five years. It also uses a highly politicized and misleading definition of Afailure.@

131

See infra, note .

132

See Schweiker Report, supra, note 2.

133

Schweiker executive summary, p. ii. Department of Education
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The reform efforts under David Hornbeck, superintendent in Philadelphia from 19942000, had showed improvement even under the limited standardized-test-score definition of
failure. Hornbeck embarked on an ambitious reform effort called Children Achieving.134 This
effort itself was controversial135 What can be determined however, is that test scores showed
improvement.136 Indeed, according to a national evaluation of standardized test scores,
Philadelphia outpaced the rest of Pennsylvania in its test score improvement for all grades tested
in all subjects tested.137 Hornbeck resigned under pressure in 2000 and was replaced by a
teamBDeidre Farmbry, a life long Philadelphia educator, as Chief Academic Officer; and Philip
Goldsmith, a business executive, as Chief Executive Officer.138 They continued the educational
reforms instituted under ChildrenAchieving but streamlined the administrative structure. Test
score gains continued.139 Neither Schweiker nor Edison addressed the past efforts except to label
them failures because the scores remained below state averages in absolute terms.
134

See Philadelphia School District, Tell Them We Are Rising: ThePhiladelphia Story,
1994-98 (2000)(on file with author).
135

Teachers were highly critical because they felt sandbagged at how testing was
handled initially. Legislators took offense when Hornbeck suggested that inequality of funding
was racistBthough his perspective is supported by Jonathan Kozol=s exploration evaluation of
school funding in the United States. See Jonathan Kozol, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES.(Harper
Perennial 1991).
136

Though I remain dubious about the value of high-stakes testing, see
infra,
those who do rely on them as the primary or exclusive means of accountability, are obligated to
consider the same information when it does not advance their goals.
137

See Council of Great City Schools, supra, note

at 9-10, 21.

138

This change in terminologyBfrom Superintendent to Chief Executive OfficerBitself is
emblematic of the marketization of education. Charter schools in Pennsylvania commonly have
Chief Academic Officers not principals.
139

See Council of Great City Schools, supra, note
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The other contested matter that Schweiker=s rhetoric ignored is the meaning of failure and
the validity of the Pennsylvania standardized tests in documenting failure. The PSSA tests use
four categories to label test scores in reading and math140Badvanced, proficient, basic and below
basic. Schweiker labeled Atragic@ and performance less that Aproficient@. But until academic
year 2001- 2002, the test was norm-referenced and those four categories represented a division
of results by quartilesBthe top 25% of the scores across the state were advanced, the next 25%
proficient, the next 25% basic and the bottom 25% were below basic.141 Thus, by Schweiker=s
definition of failure, half of the children in Pennsylvania had to fail this test. Lisa Kelly has said
that
Norm-referenced tests embody the worst of two worlds. On the one hand, if
accurately normed, the tests are set up to stigmatize half of the children as being
below average. On the other hand, usually the norms are so old that test results at
the statewide level provide a false feel-good impression that nearly all of the
children are above average. Outdated, norm-referenced tests serve no real
educational purpose at all but can function as excellent public relations tools for
the states themselves.142

140

There is a separate writing test that is administered in grades 6 and 9.

141

Press Release, PSEA Study Finds Flaws in Test Scoring Procedures,
http://www.psea.org/article.cfm?SID=236 (accessed March 9, 2003). Standard and Poor=s
evaluation clarifies this further. Pennsylvania froze the demarcation points for the PSSA
quartiles from 1996 to order to measure progress from that year. See Standard & Poors School
Evaluation Services, Statewide Insights, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Phase I Study Period,
School Years Ending 1997, 1998, 1999 at 5. (Standard and Poor=s Insights) The actual
distribution among the quartiles over these three years did not change significantly. In 1998,
50.2 % of the PSSA scores statewide were above the median, with 23.9% in the top quartile,
26.2% in the second, 26 in the third, and 23.9% in the bottom quartile. Id. at 11.
142

Lisa Kelly, Yearning for Lake Wobegon: The Quest for the Best Test at the Expense of
the Best Education, 7 Law &: Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 41, 44(1998)
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Certainly to deem the children who score in the 50-75% range as Afailures@ was harsh given that,
by definition, one fourth of the children who took the test had to be in this category.
Finally, both Edison and Schweiker ignored the social context of Philadelphia school
children. There is no discussion in either report of the literacy or employment or poverty rates of
their parents even though these factors have an enormous effect on student test results.143
Edison=s 80 page report mentioned once that Aa substantial number of the PSD=s students are
economically disadvantaged,@ and acknowledged that this Amay be a factor@ in their
performance.144 But Edison never challenged Pennsylvania=s inequitable funding structure and
referred to it only as a given, as the Aconstraints of the financial realities facing the
Commonwealth and the City.@145 The executive summary to Schweiker=s report chastised
Philadelphia for Airresponsible@ financial management for spending more than it expected to

143

See Rothstein, supra, note

144

Edison Report at 9.

at 37-40.

145

Edison Report, at 1. Edison justifies its lack of focus on socio-economic factors by
comparing Philadelphia to other urban districtsBHouston, Las Vegas, and Fort LauderdaleBwhich
achieved higher SAT scores while spending less per student than Philadelphia. Edison Report,
10-11. Edison does not provide any data on the comparative costs or socio-economic
compositions of these three districts, nor does it justify use of a selective college admissions test
for its comparison. See Council of Great City Schools, Analysis and Comment, supra, note. Use
of Houston as a positive example is ironic in hindsight as more and more information has since
developed indicating that much of Houston=s vaunted successes may have been falsified. See
Michael Winerip, The >Zero Dropout= Miracle: Alas! Alack! A Texas Tall Tale, N.Y. Times B7
(Aug. 13, 2003).
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receive in revenue, and for failing to budget more appropriately Adespite significant state-funding
increases.@146

146

Schweiker Report at i, iii. Schweiker is correct that in absolute numbers state funding
had increased but he failed to note that the state=s share of the burden of school expenses had
decreased from 55% in 1974-75 to 35% in 2000-2001.
I.
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In 2001, Pennsylvania moved the PSSA to a criteria-based test instead of a normreferenced one.147 A criteria-based test, in contrast to a norm-referenced test, evaluates students
against a pre-established set of correct answers.148 It is theoretically possible for all students to
reach the standards of advanced and proficient under criteria-referenced evaluation.149
Pennsylvania=s choice of the scores necessary to reach the acceptable standards has been harshly
criticized however. A study financed by the Pennsylvania State Education Association asserted
that, in setting the breaking points between the four categories, the Department of Education had
manipulated the data and misused the accepted methods of determining these Acut scores@ to
ratchet up the numbers of students ending up in the basic and below basic categories, putting
thousands more students in those unacceptable categories.150 Many, including me, question the

147

See Standard and Poors, Insights, supra, note

148

See Kelly, supra, note

at

at 34.

.
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Harris L. Zwerling, Ph.D., The Performance Levels and Associated Cut Scores on the
Pennsylvania System of School Assessment Mathematics and Reading Tests: A Critical Analysis
(2002) <http://www.psea.org/ftpimage/PSSAPerfLevel3-02.pdf> (accessed July 16,
2002)(Zwerling Study).
150

Id. The study, performed by Dr. Harris Zwerling, analyzed the Department=s use of
two methods of setting the points at which students fall into one of the named categoriesBthe
bookmark method and the borderline groups method. It criticized the Department=s decision to
average the results from the two methods and then to increase the averaged scores by Aonequarter standard error@ which, according to the PSEA study, decreased the number of students
achieving proficient or advanced scores by 25,000 and increased the number of students ending
up in the below basic category by 42,000. Id. at 1. The main impetus for the study was the effect
that the score setting would have on Pennsylvania=s award of diploma seals for high school
graduates who score at proficient or above on the PSSA. The study authors concluded that the
method of setting the scores imposed multiple hurdles on graduates that would deny between
7000 to 14000 students the recognition of the seal. Id. at 27.
The study also compared the scores of students within four districts on the PSSAs and the
other standardized tests administered in those districts. It found that A[s]tudents scoring below
50

wisdom and validity of using standardized test scores as the only measure of excellence.151 But
here I just stress that if that is the measure, it must be used accuratelyBwith attention to
improvements, context, and history.
The PSSA definitions are problematic enough. But this language infuses the entire
grading process and belies the rhetoric that Philadelphia lacked high standards. The report cards
for kindergarten through third grade now require the teacher to assess each child
developmentally. So far, so goodBthat sounds like useful information. But rankings still apply

basic on PSSAs approach or surpass the 50th percentile on national commercial tests, suggesting
that the below basic cut score is set too high.@ Id. at 29. For example, the fifth grade math scores
on the PSSA and the Terra Nova, a commercial standardized test used nationally, showed that
the students ranked at Basic on the PSSAs were predominantly above the 50th percentile
nationally on the Terra Nova. The Afailing@Pennsylvania students in the Below Basic category
looked much better on the Terra Nova. Those in the top rank of Below Basic were above the
50th percentile nationally on the Terra Nova while those in the bottom rank, that is the bottom 25
percent of the Below Basic category on the PSSAs were just below the bottom 25 percent
nationally on the Terra Nova. The Department of Education response to this study challenged its
findings, asserting that the comparison between the national tests and the PSSAs Aoffers little
meaningful information@ because of the Avery real possibility of inflated norms on the
commercial tests, the content nature of these tests, or their norm citations.@ AThe Department=s
decisions to apply two statistical methods, and then to slightly increase the academic rigor, were
policy decisions. Our motivation to set high standards for our children is simple: We believe
higher standards encourage higher achievement. Higher academic achievement benefits our
children and our state.@ PDE Response to PSEA=s The Performance Levels and Associated Cut
Scores on the Pennsylvania System of School Assessment, Mathematics and Reading Tests, A
Critical Analysis@ Http://www.psea.org/article.cfm?SID=146. The PSEA study echoes
Rothstein=s critique of a similar effort to define advanced, proficient, basic and below basic for
the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) exams. Under the definitions adopted
by the National Assessment Governing Board, a mere 2% of 12th grades were deemed proficient
in math in 1992 even though 3.8% of the same group got college Advanced Placement credit for
calculus and 7% scored over 600 on the math portion of the SAT. Rothstein, supra note
at
71.
151

See, e.g. Alfie Kohn, THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN DESERVE at 73-112 (N.Y.
Houghton Mifflin 1999).
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and the standards the children must satisfy are remarkably demanding. Each child must be
labeled as either advanced, proficient, basic or below basic.
Advanced means:
<
<
<
<

Goes beyond standard
Demonstrates superior understanding of concepts, skills and strategies
Demonstrates the ability to apply and extend learning
Independently explores ideas/topics

Proficient means:
<
<
<
<

Meets standard [Grade Level Expectation]
Demonstrates solid understanding of concepts, skill and strategies
Needs to demonstrate greater ability to applying and extending learning
Needs to work toward increased independent learning

Basic means:
<
<
<
<

Minimal progress toward standard
Demonstrates partial understanding of concepts, skill and strategies
Needs focused and continuous instruction
Needs increased effort

Below Basic means:
<
<
<
<

No progress toward standard
Demonstrates inadequate understanding of concepts, skills and strategies
Needs focused and continuos instruction
Needs increased effort152

The form requires the teacher to further break down the child=s literacy development to
her progress towards goals for the middle and end of each grade. Stage 4, the goal for the end of
kindergarten, for example, requires the child to demonstrate that she has the following abilities:
<
<

Draws a picture and labels in direct relationship to the picture.
Connects letters and sounds, usually initial and final consonants and some vowels,
uses phonetic spelling

152

K-3 Report Card for Philadelphia School District, 2002-2003 (on file with

author).
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<
<
<
<
<

Spells some high frequency words correctly.
Knows the direction of print
Demonstrates spacing between words
Text may contain incomplete thoughts and/or simple sentences
Parts of text may not be understandable unless dictated

By the end of second grade, that child must be doing the following:
<
<
<
<
<
<
<
<
<

Composes story that has a definite structure (clear beginning, middle, and end)
Composes text that contains main ideas supported by well-developed details
Focuses on the topic most of the time
May express ideas in a creative way or writing may contain original ideas
May use dialogue effectively
Includes rich descriptive language
Writes correct sentences that are varied in length and pattern
Uses conventional spelling most of the time
Uses correct capitalization and punctuation most of the time153

153

Explanatory booklet for K-3 Report Cards, 2002-2003, Philadelphia School District,
on file with author.
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These are admirable normative goals. But should we label an eight-year-old inadequate
or Afailing@ because she does not yet conform to the rules of grammar that some bright law
students still struggle with?154 Contrast this structure with the traditional letter grades prevalent

154

When I presented an earlier version of this paper at the Tenth Annual CLE
ConferenceBUpdate for Feminist Law Professors on February 8, 2003, I asked the participants to
identify what grade this set of report goals applied to. Only two of the nineteen participants
correctly guessed second grade. Eight picked third grade. Four thought the goals were for high
school students. I also gave them the following rubric for fourth grade for research with the
grade level blanked out:
By the end of the grade, in order to meet Grade benchmarks, a student should be able to
do the following:
1. A. Select a topic for research.
Activate prior knowledge and formulate questions about a topic.
B. Locate information using appropriate sources and strategies.
!
Locate and survey sources for a particular task (e.g. newspapers, dictionaries,
encyclopedias, nonfiction trade books, interviews, observations and electronic
media.) Locate and select relevant information from media sources such as
photographs, videos, computer software program, and telecommunications
systems.
!
Select appropriate sources.
!
Use table of contents, key words, guide words, and appendices.
!
Use traditional and electronic search tools.
C. Organize and present main ideas from the research. Check information for accuracy
and exclude extraneous or inappropriate information. Connect prior knowledge to new content.
Take notes while listening and reading using a structured format. Brainstorm what has been
learned about the topic. Summarize and synthesize information. Organize information, using
various graphic organizers. Document information. Present orally or in writing several of the
main ideas.
In order to:
-Write a report.
-Develop habits of lifelong learning.
Writing #4, Research. Grade-specific concepts/skills, Philadelphia School District.
<http://www.phila.k12.pa.us/teachers/frameworks/grid/gridmast.htm> (accessed March 10,
2003) (emphasis in original). The nineteen law professors were even more flummoxed by this
one. Only four of them correctly identified this standard as applicable to fourth grade; six chose
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in law schools. Law students care deeply about gradesBmany of them see grades as key
determinants of their futures. It is fair to say that A and B are good grades, C is problematic and
D is damning. Temple, for example, adheres to a strict B- minus curve which means most
students experience a C grade at least once during their law school careers, an experience they
generally find deeply upsetting.155 Contrast that experience with the experience of a Philadelphia
second grader. Of the four levels, only one is better than averageBadvanced. And that one
requires the student to exceed beyond the level she is being taught at. There are no A gradesBat
least not based on being excellent at what is asked and expected of you. By the definitions of the
report card, excellence at what is expected means you are proficient, not advanced. This is
certainly a message of rigor but hardly one of encouragement.156 In effect, the switch from a
broader scale has greatly narrowed the possibility for children to be told they are doing well,
better than the average. Many of them will be told they are inadequateBnot just the C but the
message equivalent of D or F. This message is unlikely to bring joy or encouragement to young
children. It is unlikely to encourage older ones but rather discourage even renewed efforts that
may still not bring them up to the abstract and demanding standard.157

fifth through seventh grades; six chose eighth or ninth; three picked tenth and twelfth grades. The
responses are on file with the author.
155

In 2001, 91% of the seniors graduated from Harvard with honors, a figure described
by the dean of Yale College as Ahilarious.@ Patrick Healy, Harvard=s honors fall to the merely
average, Boston Globe (Oct. 8, 2001)
<http://www.boston.globe.com/globe/metro/packages/harvard_honors/part2.htm> (accessed
Sept. 16, 2003).
156

See Kohn, supra, note
at 40-46 for an enlightening and detailed discussion of the
overall negative effects grades have on learning.
157

See Sara Rimer, Failing and Frustrated, School Tries Even F=s, N.Y. Times A24
(Dec. 3, 2002).
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And to make matters even more challenging, these assessments do not count for much for
either the school or the child. Instead of the assessment based on the teacher=s year- long daily
experience with the child, the determinative score is the one she gets on the PSSA. That score,
not the report card, determines whether the school is failing or not.158

158

See 24 P.S. ' 17-1702-B. Under No Child Left Behind, states have the option of using
other indicators in addition to standardized tests to evaluate a school=s statusBbut only to add it to
the list of failing schools, not to exempt it. See 20 U.S.C.' 6311(b)(2)(D)(ii).
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Federal law now defines failure by reference not only to test scores but to continual
improvement in them.159 Not only must children achieve Aproficiency,@ their schools must
demonstrate unwavering progress towards this goal. Inconsistency damns the school with the
failing label, even where, over years, the school is moving forward.160 The impact of the label is
severeBthe school must notify all parents and must allow transfer of any student to a higher
performing schoolBthough that right itself is illusory161. The dream-within-a-dream quality of
this Aright@ was heightened by recent federal regulations that eliminate lack of capacity in nonfailing schools as an excuse.162 For those like Apple who connect the rhetoric of failure with the
movement to marketize public education, these trends are both frightening and predictable. If
huge numbers of schools, even ones with rigorous standards and good teachers, are Afailing,@ and
there is no room at the district schools that have overcome the obstacles, what else is left other
than charters or vouchers?163

159

See NO Child Left behind, 20 U.S.C. ' 6311(b)(2)(C)(iii).

160

See Sam Dillon, Thousands of Schools May Run Afoul of New Law, New York Times,
Feb. 16, 2003, at 33; Michael Winerip, Defining Success in Narrow Terms, New York Times,
Feb. 19, 2003, B7; Dale Mezzacappa, et al, Pa. schools missing federal goals, Philadelphia
Inquirer (Aug. 13, 2003)(noting that over half of the schools in Pennsylvania failed to make
annual yearly progress)..
161

See infra at for analysis of the problems with the transfer provisions of No Child Left

Behind.
162

See Maria Newman, Federal Law on Failing Schools Has States Scrambling to
Comply, New York Times, July 4, 2002, B1(noting that parents at 16 schools in Camden, New
Jersey, got letters about their children=s right to transfer but the remaining 12 schools and all of
the charter schools in the district were full).
163

This Astandards without funding@ approach has been criticized. AIt is both perverse and
cruel of state officials to raise the academic requirements for public school students in New York
City while fighting furiously against efforts to provide the resources that the students need to
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reach those higher standards.@ See Bob Herbert, The Iota Standard, N.Y.Times, A15 ( July 1,
2002)(criticizing N.Y.Gov. Pataki=s response to the New York school funding litigation).
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Schweiker=s report does not explore at any length the reasons for the failure it highlights.
Failure is assumed to be the result of the Philadelphia School District=s choices164 and behavior.
Although the Schweiker Report criticizes the District for decentralizing its approach to math and
reading, it simply accepts Edison=s evaluation that the schools used 100 different reading
programs and 75 different math programs, Amany of them unproven and all of them
unsynchronized.@165 This aspect of the Edison report has been highly criticized as simply
inaccurate.166

164

See, e.g. Schweiker Report, supra note 2 at 7 (attributing Philadelphia=s problems to a
lack of a system-wide curriculum, mobility of students and insufficient teacher training and
support); and 8 (weak leadership and large central office). See Edison Report, supra note at
14, 17-21)(criticizing the District for experimenting with curricula, for a lack of rigorous
accountability for principals, for inadequate professional development, for lacking a Arequired
model for building a positive learning environment@, for lack of clear roles for Non-Teaching
Assistants (NTAs), and for insufficient data collection on discipline, and poor maintenance).
There is no mention of a lack of funding for these items though the Report does acknowledge
and blame the District for operating at a deficit. The roles of NTAs became much clearer in the
schools managed by Edison in the fall of 2002Bthey were all fired. See Paul Socolar, Public
School Notebook, CEO Vallas commits to a fresh start, 1, 13 (Fall 2002)(on file with author).
Some were later rehired at the District=s order in response to concerns about safety. Edison
suggested that the District improve its finances by taking steps to Agrow government revenue.@
165
166
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The assumption that goes unquestioned is that the academic failure is the result of bad
choices by the District, not the consequence of poor funding or perhaps the consequence of deep
societal inequity that the schools contend with but do not cause. Making test scores the only
means for defining failure begs the question of what causes low scores in the first place. A study
of students in Cleveland recently concluded that so far voucher students have performed about
the same on standardized tests as the students who sought but did not get the vouchers and
remained in the Afailing@ Cleveland Public Schools system.167 If private schooling did not result
in improved scores for these students, are the private schools failing too?168

167

See Kim K. Metcalf, et al. Evaluation of the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring
Program, Summary Report, 1998-2001 (Cleveland
Study)<www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/research/index.cfm?search_form+true&r_programs=2>
(accessed Aug. 29, 2003). AThe most recent results do not reveal any significant impacts of
participation in the CSTP [Cleveland Schools and Tutoring Program] on student achievement.@
Id. at 7. The study goes on to note a slightly greater achievement pattern for students in the
voucher program since kindergarten which might become meaningful if it continues but which
would require further study. Id. Rothstein and Beneviste=s work on comparisons between
private and public schools provides further evidence that the socio-economic backgrounds of the
students have more to do with school organization and success than does the private or public
nature of the school. See Benveniste, supra, note ; Rothstein, supra, note .
168

See Richard Rothstein, Defining Failed Schools Is Harder Than It Sounds.@ New
York Times, July 3, 2002, B9. The record of performance of charter schools in Philadelphia so
far is mixed at best. See infra at
.
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Schweiker and Edison criticized the District for operating at a deficitBfor budgeting
more for spending that it could expect to receive in revenue.169 Nowhere does either
acknowledge that Pennsylvania=s school funding structure creates grotesque inequities for poor
districts. As noted before, Philadelphians already pay a much higher percentage of their modest
incomes in taxes than do the residents of affluent suburbs. But those suburbs can raise much
more money even with lower tax rates because of higher wealth they enjoy. If Philadelphia had
chosen to live within its means,170 it is hard to imagine how much worse education might have
been in the last decade. Despite the strident calls for removal of waste, neither Edison nor
Schweiker identified any specific major savings except for privatizing maintenance and reducing
teaching staff and selling the District administration building.171 The Governor stated AThese
cost-savings would come through such measures as educational reprogramming, procurement
innovations, reducing complement through attrition and other methods.@172 Schweiker also

169

See Schweiker Report, supra note 2; Edison Report, supra, note

.

170

Hornbeck=s approach was to budget what he deemed necessary for quality education
under the Children Achieving model. He acknowledged that the Philadelphia School District
lacked the revenue to fund this model but his approach was to force a showdown with the state
over funding inequities. Many commentators believed that Mayor Street=s intent in agreeing to
the Edison assessment and state takeover was to force the state to acknowledge that the
Philadelphia School District was underfunded and to make funding the state=s problem.
171

Edison Report, supra, note

172

Edison=s and Schweiker=s credibility was further undercut by their insistence that the
Philadelphia School District spends less on lower-performing schools. See Edison Report, supra,
note at 34 (calling for additional money for privately managed schools to Aremedy a tragic
inequity that persists with the District-that the lowest performing schools receive less per pupil
support than higher-performing schools, which tend to garner the more experienced teachers as
well as greater overall resources.@) This was echoed in the governor=s executive summary where
it is stated as a Afinding@ that the District Asystematically allocates the lowest level of per-pupil
resources to its lowest- performing schools.@ Schweiker Report, Executive Summary at iv. Later
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failed to explain why, if Philadelphia=s deficit was the result of waste, its future should be tied to
a corporation, Edison, that had never produced a profit.173

in the Schweiker Report, this assertion becomes factBAlow performing schools usually receive
the least amount of dollars from the district.@ Id. at 11.
However, Edison cited no statistics or data to support its original assertion. Its sole
support is a footnote asserting that AAlthough difficult to prove conclusively, anecdotal evidence
suggest that the worst-performing schools indeed get the least resources. It makes intuitive sense
that experienced teachers would gravitate towards assignments in better-performing schools,
driving up per-pupil allocations in those schools through their higher salaries and through their
greater experience in securing resources for their departments and classes. The net result is that
the worst-performing schools tend to have less experienced teachers less adept at working the
system to their and their students= advantage.@ Edison Report, supra, note
at 34, n. 92. The
teachers= collective bargaining agreement does give teachers with greater seniority greater
transfer rights which results in an overabundance of less experienced teachers in schools that are
perceived as less desirable teaching environmentsBnot coincidentally often the lower-performing
schools. However this disparity is not the result of budget decisions by the central
administration. As Debra Kahn, the city=s Secretary of Education, pointed out, baseball teams
may have shortstops with different salaries but they all field the same number of players. Chris
Brennan, State school $ allocation challenged, Philadelphia Daily News (Jul. 23, 2002)
<http://www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/news/local/3716697.htm>(accessed Sept. 15, 2003).
173

See William C. Symonds, Edison: How Big A Blow To School Choice? Business
Week at 44 (June 3, 2002).
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Philadelphia=s experience bears out Apple=s theory that the rhetoric of failure is necessary
to justify the need for Aconservative modernization@Bboth the adherents of the state of families
and the adherents of the state of individuals base their calls for change on a picture of existing
schools as failures.174 Apple see these claims of failure as attacks on democratic education itself,
an attack on the idea of education for common citizenship that was the purpose of public schools
in the first place.175 The common equating of failing as a synonym for urban for city schools,
especially in the Philadelphia experience bears this out. The use of high-stakes testing as the
primary means of evaluating schools leads to and even justifies greater stratification of children
based on their alleged abilities as measured by a test whose results are tied so closely to
economic privilege.176

174

AOur educational institutions are seen as total failures. High dropout rates, a decline in
>functional literacy,= a loss of standards and discipline, the failure to teach >real knowledge= and
economically useful skills, poor scores on standardized test, and moreBall these are charges
leveled at schools.@ Apple, supra note at 35.
175

ABehind all of these charges is an attack on egalitarian norms and values. Though
hidden in the rhetorical flourishes of the critics, in essence >too much democracy=Cculturally and
politicallyBis seen as one of the major causes of >our= declining economy and culture.@ Apple,
supra, note at 36. Apple sees the attack on public education as an attack on shared experience-AEven with the evident shortcomings of many public schools, at the very least they provide >a
kind of social glue, a common cultural reference point in our polyglot, increasingly multicultural
society.@ Id. at 177 (internal quotes omitted).
176

Lisa Kelly points out that

AIn addition to the explicit goals of measuring school outcomes and individual student
success, these testing requirements also have effects, perhaps unintended, that should be
considered carefully before we as a nation continue to hurtle down this road of more and earlier
testing of elementary school children. These effects include incentives for teachers to sacrifice
developmentally appropriate curricula in order to teach to tests and a deepening of racial and
class differences in an educational system that sacrifices children of color and poor children to
make the dream of Lake Wobegon come true fo the children of privilege. Children of the poor
and communities of color become the leaven that allows for the remainder of American children
to rise above average.@
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Lisa Kelly, Yearning for Lake Wobegon: The Quest for the Best Test at the Expense of
the Best Education, 7 Law &: Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 41, 42 (1998).
See also, Kohn, supra note at 102(AStandards are essentially used as selection devices to
privilege some over others. This movement is not only more about demanding than supporting,
it is more about sorting than teaching.@).
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The use of the rhetoric of failure to attack the existence of public education and to deny
the ability of common schools to effectively educate children stands in sharp contrast to the
rhetoric of courts that have denied equity challenges to school funding. The judicial rhetoric in
the school funding cases provides a telling contrast to the rhetoric of failure.177 The Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court recently rejected a claim that the inequities of New
York=s property tax based school funding system deprive New York City public school students
of their state constitutional right to Athe opportunity of a sound basic education.@178 The court
found that the plaintiffs= concession that the schools were providing skills on an eighth and ninth
grade level sufficiently enabled graduates to obtain employment, vote and serve on a jury, and
thus satisfied the sound basic education requirement.179 The appellate court rejected the trial
court=s determination that the New York Constitution required schooling that would prepare
students for something more than minimum wage employment, noting that A[i]t cannot be said,
however, that a person who is engaged in a >low-level service job= is not a valuable, productive
177

Scholars group the school funding cases into three phasesBfederal equal protection
challenges, equity challenges based on state constitutional provisions, and adequacy cases. See,
e.g, James E. Ryan, The Infuence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 432, 448
(1999); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation and the AThird Wave@:
From Equity to Adequacy, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1151 (1995). The shift to adequacy was largely
strategic according to Ryan but represents, at minimum, a concession that equality is no longer
even an aspiration. This retrenching contrasts painfully with the demands of No Child Left
Behind that all schools end Afailure@ for all students, regardless of the needs and demands of the
school=s population.
178

Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 744 N.Y.S. 2d 130 (Sup. Ct. App. Div.
2002) (quoting the Education Article of the New York State Constitution, N.Y. Const. art. XI, '
1)(aff=d in part and rev=d in part, 2003 WL 21468502 (N.Y. Jun. 26, 2003).
.
179

Id. at 139
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member of society.@180 It further rejected the evidence of poor performance on standardized
tests, poor graduation rates, and low rates of students qualifying for the more highly valued
Regents= diploma, noting that some students do perform well and that the Aproper standard is that
the State must offer all children the opportunity of a sound basic education, not ensure that they
actually receive it. Thus, the mere fact that some students do not achieve a sound basic
education does not necessarily mean that the State has defaulted on its obligation.@181

180

Id. at 138.

181

Id. at 143.
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The court used the evidence of the high poverty rates and other demographic factors to
excuse the state=s obligation, instead of heightening it, saying that Athe cure lies in eliminating
the socio-economic conditions facing certain students@182 In a nutshell, the state is allowed to
ignore its obligation to educate all students for civic participation so long as some of them
manage to succeed with what is offered even if the majority cannot. Justice Thurgood Marshall
aptly critiqued such a view in 1973 noting: AThat a child forced to attend an underfunded school
with poorer physical facilities, less experienced teachers, larger classes, and a narrower range of
courses than a school with substantially more fundsBand thus with greater choice in educational

182

Id. at 144. ABoth parties agree that the City students= lower test results in comparison
with the rest of the State are largely the result of demographic factors, such as poverty, high
crime neighborhoods, single parent or dysfunctional homes, homes where English is not spoken
or homes where parents offer little help with homework and motivation. Although there was
evidence that certain >time on task= programs, such as specialized reading courses, tutoring and
summer school could help such >at-risk= students, nevertheless, plaintiffs= own expert . . .
conceded that investing money >in the family= rather than the schools >might pay off even more.=
That is not to say that this circumstance lessens the State=s burden to educate such students. But
it is an indication of the fact that more spending on education is not necessarily the answer . . . A
Id. at 144. The appellate court rejected the rhetoric and findings of the trial court which, in
contrast, had found AThe establishment of such a causal link might appear to be fairly
straightforward. If it can be shown that increased funding can provide New York City with
better, teachers, better school buildings, and better instrumentalities of learning, then it would
appear that a causal link has been established between the current funding system and the poor
performance of the City=s public schools.@ Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 719 N.Y.S.
2d 475, 521 (Sup.Ct., 2001). The trial court quoted the testimony of former SED Commissioner
Thomas Sobel:
AIf you ask the children to attend school in conditions where plaster is crumbling, the roof
is leaking and classes are being held in unlikely places because of overcrowded conditions, that
says something to the child about how you diminish the value of the activity and of the child=s
participation in it and perhaps of the child himself. If, on the other hand, you send a child to a
school in well-appointed or [adequate facilities] that sends the opposite message. That says this
counts. You count. Do well.@ id. at 506
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planningBmay nevertheless excel is to the credit of the child, not the State.@183 For Philadelphia,
the state demanded that the city schools perform the very obligation that the state refused to
assumeBthat it educate the children of poverty without the resources necessary to do it well.
B. Rhetoric of accountability

183

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1322
(1973)(Marshall, J. dissenting).
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What is the solution to failure? In a word, accountabilityBand that word itself translates
directly to accountability in the form of standardized test results and private management.
Schweiker=s principles and his report consistently support his conclusion that the Philadelphia
School District should be privatizedBthat the solution to its academic and financial woes is
management by a separate organization because privatization would enhance accountability.184
The overstatement of the failure of the system; the insistence that the system had no
accountability systems,185 and that the financial problems were the result of mismanagement, not
funding inequity all were used to support the single solutionBhire a private manager who will run
the system under a contract with Aaccountability,@ more efficiently.186 And who did the governor
determine that manager should be? None other than the assessor itself, Edison Schools, Inc.
Schweiker=s report treated accountability as a question of test scoresBelementary schools
were to increase their PSSA scores by 25 points over five years; middle schools and high schools
were to achieve those gains within seven years.187 But his insistence that private management
would improve test scores was not supported by the record of either Edison itself or that of the
charter schools already in operation in Philadelphia.188

184

Schweiker Report, supra, note 2 at 14, 16, 17, 18, 25.

185

Id. at 8.

186

Id. 25.

187

Id. at 24.

188

See infra notes and accompanying text.
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This version of accountability through privatization and choice makes students and their
parents into consumers who are then individually responsible for their choices and their
outcomes.189 Such a limited version of accountability not only allows but virtually requires the
imposition of the family state of the neoconservative branch of the school reform movement.190
It is also a necessary prerequisite for choiceBbut Schweiker=s version of accountability and
reform omits this componentBchoice is not part of the picture of reform for Philadelphia. Apple
notes that the equating of high stakes testing and accountability also benefits the managerial class
at the expense of equity.191 Standardization is the prerequisite for choice and marketing of
schools because it provides the consumer/parent with Aobjective@ data to inform their choice.192
This also allows blame to be placed on the parent who fails to choose a Asuccessful@ school for
189

AThe entire project of neoliberalism is connected to a larger process exporting the
blame from the decisions of dominant groups onto the state and onto poor people.@ Apple supra,
note at 39.
190

A[A]mong the policies being proposed under this [neoconservative] ideological
position are mandatory national and statewide curricula, national and statewide testing, a >return=
to higher standards, a revivification of the >Western tradition,= patriotism, and conservative
variants of character education.@ Apple, supra at 47.
191

AA good deal of the current emphasis in schools on high-stakes testing, on more
rigorous forms of accountability, and on tighter control is not totally reducible to the needs of
neoliberals and neoconservatives. Rather, part of the pressure for these policies comes form
educational managers and bureaucratic offices who fully believe the such control is warranted
and >good.= Not only do these forms of control have an extremely long history in education, but
tighter control, high-stakes testing and (reductive) accountability methods provide more dynamic
roles fro such managers . . . .These policies enable such actors to engage in a moral crusade and
enhance the status of their own expertise.
Yet, in a time when competition for credentials and cultural capital is intense, the
increasing power of mechanisms of rest ratification such as the return of high levels of
mandatory standardization also provides mechanisms that enhance the chances that the children
of the professional and managerial new middle class will have less competition from other
children.@ Apple, supra, note at 58
192

Apple, supra, note

at 60.
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her children and eliminates the state=s obligation to secure even an Aadequate,@ let alone a
Aquality@ education for each child.193 Schweiker=s rhetoric foreshadows the placement of this
obligation on individual parents but it explicitly holds the state blameless for failing to
adequately fund public education and makes Philadelphia solely responsible for its Abad@
choices.

193

A[O]ne of [the] effects is that when the poor >choose= to keep their children in
underfunded and decaying schools in the inner cities or in rural areas (given the decline and
expense of under mass transportation, poor information, and the absence of time, and their
decaying economic conditions, to names by a few of the realities), they (the poor) will be blamed
individually and collectively for making bad >consumer choices.=@ Id. at 60.
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The Ait=s poverty, not funding@ argument of the New York appellate court in the school
funding case also abdicated responsibility for education for the common citizenship necessary to
democracy.194 If we are serious about providing equal access to education for all our children,
then we need to account for and at least attempt to ameliorate the effects of poverty, not write
them off. The position of the state in the New York case allowed the state to blame the children
for their own deficienciesBor at minimum, blame their parents= poverty. Although, the appellate
court treated test scores more realistically, recognizing that Amyriad@ factors affect scores,195 it
then used the more realistic view to potentially deprive the kids, not empower them by excusing
the state from any responsibility to improve the education that could have contributed to the
lower scores.196 Pennsylvania=s Education Empowerment Act similarly uses test scores to punish

194

See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 744 NYS 2d 130, 144(NY Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 2002) (finding no causal link between funding and New York City public school
students= test scores and denying relief, in part because: ABoth parties agree that the City
students= lower test results in comparison with the rest of the State are largely the result of
demographic factors, such as poverty, high crime neighborhoods, single parent or dysfunctional
homes, homes where English is not spoken or homes where parents offer little help with
homework and motivation. . . . That is not to say that this circumstance lessens the State=s burden
to educate such students. But it is an indication of the fact that more spending on education is
not necessarily the answer, and suggests that the cure lies in eliminating the socio-economic
conditions facing certain students.@). The Pennsylvania Constitution requires that the
Commonwealth provide a Athorough and efficient@ system of education. However, the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court was content to interpret a similar state constitutional
requirement as obligating the state only to provide the Athe opportunity of a sound basic
education, not ensure that they actually receive it.@ Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New
York, 744 NYS 2d 130, 143 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2002) rev=d 2003 WL 21468502 (June 26,
2003).
195

Id. at 135 (Noting test performance must be used Acautiously as there are a myriad of
factors which have a causal bearing on test results.@)
196

Id. at 144.
72

districts without consideration of any of the factors that affect test scores and without more
money.197 The federal No Child Left Behind Act simply uses test scores to offer the hollow
promise that children can move to a higher performing schoolBbut does not offer requirements
or funds to make that happen and the transfers are likely to leave the former school even worse
off, having lost a child whose parent had the energy and care to take action.198
Governor Schweiker and Secretary Zogby enthusiastically greeted No Child Left
Behind=s enactment with Schweiker calling it Aa landmark law [that] offers . . . our schools a
chance to make sweeping improvements . . . [and will] empower parents and children to choose
the education that=s best for them . . . .199 Zogby added, A In Pennsylvania, we=ve built our most
powerful educational reforms around the ideas embodied in the President=s education agenda.
Assessments measure learningBand we can improve only what we measure. More information
about our schools makes them more accountable to parents and students. Giving parents more
choices helps them better guide their child=s academic development.@200

197

See 24 P.S. '17-1701 et seq.

198

See infra.

199

Pa. Dept. of Ed. Press Release, Jan. 9, 2002.

200

Pa. Dept. of Ed. Press Release, Jan. 9, 2002. (emphasis supplied). Zogby=s attraction
to numbers evokes Alfie Kohn=s worry about our Acultural penchant for attaching numbers to
things.@ Kohn, supra, note at 75.
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Accountability in this form is necessary for public schools but not, apparently, for
privatized or charter schools.201 Edison=s own choppy history contradicts its claims of success202
A New York Times investigation showed that Edison=s method of evaluating its own schools=
progress on standardized tests was highly questionable. Edison has consistently asserted that test
scores at 84 percent of the schools that it began managing before 2001 have improved.203 To
calculate that figure, Edison takes the average annual change in test scores for each grade on
each subject tested to arrive at a single school-wide average.204 If the number is greater than
zero, the company rates the school as improving. 205 The flaw of this method is that gains in one
grade can mask an overall decline. AThe same formula produced similarly glowing results when
applied, for example, to schools in the Cleveland school district, which has struggled
academically in recent years,[ the system repeated described as failing by Justice Thomas206.]
When asked by The New York Times to subject its test results over the last five years to Edison=s
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AUnlike interdistrict choice plans, which have either grown slowly or withered, charter
schools are the kudzu of school choice@ growing to enroll over 500,000 by 1997. James E. Ryan
and Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 Yale L. J. 2043, 2074 (2002).
202

.Jacques Steinberg and Diana B. Henriques, Complex Calculations on Academics,
New York Times (July 16, 2002).
203

See Edison Schools, Inc. Advertisement, New York Times A9 (Oct. 28, 2002).
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Steinberg and Henriques, supra, note
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Id.

206

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2480 (2002)(Thomas, J. concurring).
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.

method, Cleveland achieved comparable results: 87.4 percent of its elementary and middle
schools rated >positive.=@207

207

Id. Edison=s method contrasts starkly with No Child Left Behind=s requirements that
schools demonstrate Adequate Yearly Progress not only for each grade but for each designated
sub-group within the test pool. Public schools are not allowed to Ahide@ lower test results with
gains overallBbut Edison=s methods were implicitly approved of and explicitly relied on by
Governor Schweiker in his push to turn the entire Philadelphia school system over to Edison=s
management.
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Schweiker=s reliance on PSSA scores as proof of failure for traditional public schools
contrasts with his lack of concern about the even worse PSSA test scores of charter schools.208
Failure apparently has different meanings for these two types of schools. Traditional public
schools are judged by test scores in a vacuumBnothing else countsBnot parent satisfaction, not
other student achievements. But charter schools are exempt from accountability under highstakes testing because they are providing Aexciting educational options.@.209

208

One of Schweiker=s ten principles of reform was that ACharter schools must be valued
in any reform plan. Any effort to control the district=s charter school costs must be grounded in
the fact that charter schools are providing some of the most exciting educational options
available to Philadelphia parents.@ Schweiker Report, Principle 10. This language was taken
directly from the Edison Report itself at 66. Indeed, the PSSA scores for 2002-2003 landed 36
out of the 46 Philadelphia charter schools warnings or placement on the No Child Left Behind
Afailure to meet annual yearly progress@ list, continuing to show that, whatever their other
advantages, accountability in the form of standardized test scores is not something charter
schools have yet been able to offer consistently to Philadelphia. See Dale Mezzacappa, Pa.
schools missing federal goals, Philadelphia Inquirer at A1, 8 (Aug. 13, 2003).
209

This inconsistency applies to voucher programs as well. Florida=s Education
Commissioner state that where vouchers were concerned, Athe primary accountability and
responsibility lies with the parents.@ www.sptimes.com/2003/08/03/Perspective/school-doublestandar.shtml. The article goes on to quote Florida legislator Joe Negron, a sponsor of the
voucher legislation as saying, APrimarily, the obligation for accountability in voucher programs
comes form the community and parents, not state government.@ Id. Parental satisfaction is
sufficient for private and privatized education but irrelevant for public schools.
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Where the rhetorical view of public schools is hostile and damning, the rhetorical
approach to charter schools is quite the opposite. Schweiker and privatization supporters
describe charters as exciting, innovative, offering the best opportunity for choice.210 For
example, on Dec. 5, 2001, Secretary Zogby, announcing the award of $475,000 in planning
grants for new charter schools, said, A[u]sing these grants, dedicated Pennsylvanians can make a
difference in the lives of children by giving them a choice to attend a charter school. New,
innovative charter schools give parents more opportunities to give their children the education
that=s best for them.@211 What is similar, however, is the dissonance between the rhetoric and the
reality. The same law makers who criticized public schools as failing because their students
exhibited unsatisfactory test scores were untroubled by charter schools that had no better and
often worse records.212
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See Edison Report, Schweiker Report. Edison did minimally acknowledge that
charter schools are a costly option for the school district. It recommended that the District find a
way of controlling charter costsBthough it made no specific suggestions for how this could be
accomplished and cautioned that the District has Ato do this in a way that does not harm charter
schools, which have provided some of the most innovative and exciting new educational options
for Philadelphia parents.@ Edison Report at 66.
211

Pa. Dept. of Education Press Release, Dec. 5, 2001. The press release goes on to say
Acharter schools are independent public schools designed by local citizens, including parents,
teachers and community and business leaders. Charter schools offer a specific, often unique, and
always locally driven educational mission.@ Secretary Zogby does not explain where national
for-profit entities who operate charter schoolsBincluding Edison and MosaicaBfit into this locally
driven mission.
212

See Pennsylvania School Reform Network, Evaluating the Evaluation: Notes and
Critical Questions About the Interim Report on Charter Schools in Pennsylvania, which
criticized the Pennsylvania Department of Education=s refusal to release a department-funded
report on charter schools performed by The Evaluation Center at Western Michigan University.
The report=s findings included that Aon average [charter schools] scored 60 points lower than
comparable traditional public schools on the state=s reading and math tests, a gap that widened 30
percent from 46 points the previous year.@ The Report also notes that the lack of data supplied
by the Department of Education compromised its ability to determine accountability. Finally,
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the data showed charter schools had declining numbers of children on the free and reduced-price
lunch programs and in special education programs which the PSRN noted may indicate
Askimming@.
78

Philadelphia in 2000-2001 had 34 charter schools.213

Using the coin of the realmBthe

PSSA scores that determine empowerment or death for public schools, the Philadelphia charter
schools do not shine. Keep in mind that the Empowerment Act subjects to state takeover,
schools with a Ahistory of extraordinarily low test performance@ which is defined as Acombined
average of sixty per centum (60%) or more of students scoring in the bottom measured group of
twenty-five per centum (25%) or below basic level of performance on the Pennsylvania System
of School Assessment test . . . . in math and reading in the most recent two school years for
which scores are available.@ A history of low test performanceBcombined average of 50%Bgets a
public school on the empowerment list. Of the 34 charter schools in Philadelphia in 2000-2001,
19 had test scores in this category.214 Indeed, compared directly to the Afailing@ schools of
Philadelphia, nine of the 16 charter schools reported a higher percentage of fifth grade PSSA

213

See Greater Philadelphia Urban Affairs Coalition, Profiles: A Directory of
Philadelphia Charter Schools, 2000-2001 (2001)<www.gpuac.org/csprofile.pdf> (accessed Sept.
11, 2003)(on file with author)
214

According to the School Profiles available on the Pennsylvania Dept. of Ed. website,
the following charter schools had at least 60% of their tested fifth students in the Below Basic
category on the PSSA: Alliance for Progress, 71% math, 70% reading; Eugenio Maria de
Hostos, 82% math, 84% reading; Germantown Settlement, 86% math, 66% reading; Imani
Circle, 76% math; Leadership Learning, 88% math, 69% reading; Harambee Institute, 64 %
math, 75% reading; Raising Horizons Quest, 78% math, 60% reading; Renaissance Advantage,
85% math, 72% reading; West Oak Lane, 63% math. For eighth graders, the following schools=
scores qualified: Community Academy, 86% math; Eugenio Maria de Hostos, 78% math; Freire,
79% math, 60% reading; Germantown Settlement, 88% math, 64% reading; Imani Circle, 92%
math; Math Civics and Sciences, 80% math; Renaissance 75% math; Wakisha 77% math. The
high schools showed a similar pattern with the following schools having at least 60% of eleventh
graders below basic on either reading or math: Architecture and Design, 69% math; Center for
Eocnomics and Law, 76% math; Community Academy 76% math; Delaware Valley, 94% math,
86 % reading; Franklin Towne, 72% math; Imhotep Institute, 89% math; Multi-Cultural
Academy, 66% math; Preparatory, 66% math.
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scores in the below basic category than the average for Philadelphia fifth graders.215 Half the
charter schools had a higher percentage of eighth grade students come in below basic than the
Philadelphia School District . In high school, 7 out of 10 charter schools reported a higher
percentage of eleventh grade below basic scores than the Philadelphia School District.216 But the
legislative enactments, Schweiker and Zogby continued to insist that charter schools are great
and the public schools are failures.
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Some of the charter schools escaped testing altogether because they did not have
students in the tested grades. The Empowerment Act categories also cover an average of two
years.
216

Perhaps ironically, in the scores released in October 2002, the one charter school run
by Edison Schools, Inc., Mariana Bracetti Academy Charter School, had the lowest scores of all
Philadelphia charter schools for eighth grade math and reading. It came in second to last on
eighth grade math and reading for the entire Philadelphia School District. Chris Brennan, Edison
Charter in Kensington=s Failing Too, Philadelphia Daily News (Nov. 4, 2002). Edison
spokesperson Adam Tucker blamed the public schools that the charter schools transferred from
for the low showing. AThese scores very much reflect where our students came into the school,@
Tucker said. Id. Tucker did not explain why Bracetti transfers did so much worse than students
who transferred into other charters or remained in the ostensibly inadequate public schools.
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This limited vision of accountability makes sense only from a perspective of misguided
simplicityBstandardized tests are easier to administer and to reduce to statistics than any portfolio
or other broad form of evaluation.217 It also makes sense if the real goal is to privatize public
education218 The necessity of scores becomes the justification for vouchers, charters and other
forms of privatization because the public system is set up for failure by the rigidity of the testing
regime. The similarity of test scores in charter and privatized schools and traditional public
schools that serve similar populations is not really surprising given the mounting evidence that
the socio-economic base of the student body has the most significant effect on the academic
achievement of the students.219 I align with those who call for much broader means of
evaluating students and schools and less or no reliance on high-stakes testing.220 But whatever
the means of accountability, the least useful and least fair is to apply rigorous high-stakes testing
only to traditional public schools and to allow charters or private schools to bask in
accountability by parent satisfaction alone.221
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See Kohn, supra, note

at 74-75.
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No Child Left Behind=s draconian transfer provisions make much more sense when
looked at with this purpose in mind.
219

Benveniste, supra, note at
. The rhetoric of accountability that equates
standardized test scores and accountability also ignores mounting evidence that the key
determinate of test scores is the socio-economic status of the cohort of students in the school, not
whether the school is private or public. See Rothstein, supra note
, at ; Minow, supra note
, at 279.
220

See Kohn, supra, note

at 74-75.
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It is not so clear that charters and vouchers would fare well under that accountability
system either as some studies show frequent parental rejection of charters and vouchers as well.
It is difficult to find statistics as the publically available documents simply list the number of
students who leave in a given year and provide no information on where they go or why.
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C.

Rhetoric of empowerment
AWhenever possible, reform should be a vehicle to empower the Philadelphia community

to take charge of its schools.@222
The rhetoric of accountability says accountability is supposed to empower parents and
students to escape from failure through choice. This choice story evokes Gutmann=s states of
families and individuals, both of whom seek to transfer control over education from the state or
community to the individual or family.223 and is grounded, substantially, in the bible of
privatization, Chubb and Moe=s POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA=S SCHOOLS.224 .

222

Principle 10 of Governor Schweiker=s Education Reform Proposal, Schweiker Report,
supra, note 2 at 4.
223

Gutmann, supra note at 28-41.

224

See supra, note 13.
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It is beyond the scope of this article to fully develop the theories of choice or to do
adequate justice to the critiques of it225. But to evaluate the rhetoric and reality of the
Philadelphia reform process, some basic understanding is in order. Choice in its most advanced
form, laid out by Chubb and Moe, is supposed to provide improvement in education both in
quality and cost through individualization and reliance on parents as consumers.226 Each parent
will receive public funds to pay for her child=s education. The parent will choose among
available schools and the parent=s choice will determine the continued existence of schoolsBthose
that attract parents will thrive, those that are not chosen will die.227 This story on its face
seemingly puts all power in the hands of parents who, presumably, know what is best for the
children and will make the best choices on their behalf.

225

See,e.g. James S. Liebman, Voice Not Choice, 101 Yale L. J. 259 (1991); Molly
O=Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial Politics,
64 Tenn L Rev 359, 374-385 (1997).
226

See Chubb and Moe, supra, note .

227

See Chubb and Moe, supra, note at 185-229.
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Chubb and Moe assume that is what exists is bad and drastic reform for excellence is
needed. Their belief the current system of public education is so bad is again based mostly on
test scores. Their introduction cites falling SAT scores, high drop out rates, the alleged poor
showing of U.S. students on international tests, and relies heavily on the Amother of all
critiques@228, A Nation At Risk.229 Chubb and Moe ultimately conclude that the institutional and
democratic structure of public education is the problemBthe very fact that schools are operated
through democratic systems prevents them from being responsive to the need for change.230
They argue that the professionalization of education deprived parents of control and created
sluggish, unwieldy bureaucracies that exist to perpetuate themselves rather than to provide
optimal educational environments. In a nutshell, the claim is that schools that perform best are
those with effective organizationBAclear goals, an ambitious academic program, strong
educational leadership, and high levels of teacher professionalism.@231 They further conclude that
schools with the most autonomy have the best organization, and that the current system thwarts
rather than encourages autonomy.232 The solution is the marketBindividualized funding will
encourage each family to choose the best school and that individual use of the market will force
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O=Brien, supra, note at 393 (quoting David C. Berliner and Bruce J. Biddle, THE
MANUFACTURED CRISIS: MYTHS, FRAUDS, AND THE ATTACK ON AMERICA=S PUBLIC SCHOOLS, at
139 (1995).
229

National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation At Risk (1983); Chubbs
and Moe, supra, note at 9-11.
230

Id. at 2,18-20,28-30.

231

Id. at. 23.

232

Id.
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schools to improve or die. Market-based education is the panacea that will cure failure in
schools.233

233

Id. at 217.
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Chubb and Moe express no concern about profit or the potential conflict in mission
between shareholders and students. Their conception appears to be that existing non-profit
schools will be source of education and that new non-profits will spring up to meet the demand
once students and their families control the system by having all funding individualized. They
also pay little attention to access problemsBhow to protect children whose parents may lack the
ability or energy to study the market options.234 Some who rely on their theories express no
concern at all about access and consider that parental deficits are just part of the fall out; the
system just fairly rewards parents who do care.235
Apple, O=Brien, James Liebman and others have thoughtfully and extensively critiqued
the theories animating Chubb and Moe=s proposals and the empirical work supporting it.236

234

They do propose a vaguely described government back up plan. Id. at 221-226. Other
advocates of choice deny that this is a source of concern. See Jonathan B. Cleveland, School
Choice: American Elementary and Secondary Education Enter the AAdapt or Die@ Environment
of a Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. Marshall L. Rev. 75, 132-135 (1995) A[S]chools should
survive or fail according to their academic performance. Accordingly, a school should expire if
its students score lower on standardized tests or are not admitted to desirable colleges.@ Id. at
123.
235

See Douglas J. Besharov, Creating a Marketplace for Social Welfare Services, 16
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol=y 519, 528 n. 25 (2002). William Rusher, a supporter of
vouchers, opined that:
Our system of free public education has been one of America=s glories. But in recent
decades, the nation=s determination to provide equal opportunities to all youngsters, minority and
nonminority alike, has flooded inner-city schools with unmanageable numbers of underachieving
>students.= . . . . [S]ome ghetto parents too stoned on drugs themselves, or otherwise beaten down
to know or care what is happening to their children in school . . . .There are, of course, some
essentially ineducable youngsters in the ghettos on whom vouchers would simply be wasted.
William Rusher, The ABC=s of tuition vouchers, Washington Times (Mar. 14, 2002)
<http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20020314-2472146.htm> (accessed Sept. 16, 2003).
236

See Apple, supra, note ; O=Brien, supra, note ; Liebman, supra, note .
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James Liebman argued that Chubb and Moe Atranslated correlation into cause@237 Choice
becomes the ultimate schooling for families that provides no protection for the children
disadvantaged by poverty and racism. The market vision is squarely grounded in individualist
notion that places no real value on collective interests.238 Apple points out that the parents
empowered by choice are those who already enjoy the advantages of class, affluence, and,
typically, race.
Middle-class parents are clearly the most advantaged in this kind of cultural
assemblage, and not only . . . because schools seek them out. Middle-class
parents have become quite skilled, in general in exploiting market mechanisms in
education and in bringing their social, economic, and cultural capital to bear on
them. Middle class parents are more likely to have the knowledge, skills and
contacts to decode and manipulate what are increasingly complex and deregulated
systems of choice and recruitment. The more deregulation, the more possibility
of informal procedures being employed. The middle class also, on the whole, are
more able to move their children around the system . . . because class and race
intersect and interact in complex ways and because marketized systems in
education often expressly have their conscious and unconscious raison d=etre in a
fear of >the Other@ and these often are hidden expressions of a racialization of
educational policy, the differential results will >naturally= be decidedly raced as
well as classed.@239
237

Liebman, supra, note at 262. Liebman points out that Chubb=s and Moe=s definition
of effectiveness was their own invention based on subjective factors.
238

Liebman offers the reform of voice insteadBeliminate the private option, keep
everyone in the collective system so that the disadvantaged will benefit from the one clear factor
that all studies support, that schools with higher percentages of economically advantaged and
involved parents do better. See id. at 295-308. Needless to say, no major player pushing reform
in the Philadelphia process has advocated that idea.
239

Apple, supra, note
at 73. AEconomic and social capital can be converted into
cultural capital in various ways. In marketized plans, more affluent parents often have more
flexible hours and can visit multiple schools. They have carsBoften more than oneBand can
afford driving their children across town to attend a >better= schools. They can as well provide
the hidden cultural resources such as camps and after-school programs (dance, music, computer
classes, etc.) that give their children an >ease,= a >style,= that seems >natural= and acts as a set of
cultural resources. Their previous stock of social and cultural capitalBwho they know, their
>comfort= in social encounters with educational officialsBis an unseen but powerful storehouse of
resources. Thus, more affluent parents are more likely to have the informal knowledge and
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skillBwhat Bourdieu would call the habitusBto be able to decode and use marketized forms to
their own benefit. This sense of what might be called >confidenceBwhich is itself the result of
past choices that tacitly but no less powerfully depend on the economic resources to actually
have had the ability to make economic choicesBis the unseen capital that underpins their ability
to negotiate marketized forms and >work the >system= through sets of informal cultural rules.@ Id.
at 73.
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The history of the voucher movement illustrates this all too well and demonstrates why it
is essential to consider both the proposed reforms and the reality they address in a historical
context. Molly O=Brien emphasizes need for historical perspective on the voucher movement,
which, she notes, originally grew out of racist white objections to looming desegregation
orders.240 The Achoice@ was choice to avoid equality and integration. O=Brien challenges the
more benign view of the origins of choice, and says the original call for vouchers Ademonstrably
coincide[d] with the white conservative pursuit of dominance and privilege.@241 O=Brien points
out that there was no evidence of parental objection to school placement before desegregation242
and no factual evidence to Asupport the theory of public school decline.@243 O=Brien situates the
rise of the voucher movement in the historical context of civic republicanism=s relationship to
public education which was seen as necessary for citizens to effectively participate in the
political community.244 But these democratic ideals of the nineteenth century contrasted with the
discriminatory reality of slavery and anti-immigrant fervor, and themselves involved an element
240

O=Brien debunks the attribution of choice through vouchers to Milton Friedman who
proposed them in 1955. She traces the racist history preceding Milton Friedman=s voucher
proposal in which southern avowed segregationists proposed vouchers as part of several
successful efforts to evade implementation of Brown v. Board of Education. See O=Brien, Private
School, supra, note at 374-385.
241

Id. at 363.

242

Id. at 363

243

Id. at 364

244

Id. at 369-370. AThe concept of universally available, no-cost, empowering education
was and remains a radical idea. It embraces citizen equality; it requires collective exercise of
responsibility for the education of each citizen; and it rejects wealth or social position as the
prerequisites to citizenship and education for citizenship.@ Id. at 371
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of privilegeBthe creation of educational credentials allowed the middle class to maintain
privileges associated with those credentials.245 These two contradictory visions, education for
citizenship and education for advantage, with vouchers a part of the latter vision, Aarose in
reaction to African-American efforts to gain an education for citizenship. It grew out of the
impulse to preserve privilege and to protect social and economic advantage in a competitive
market. The tuition voucher movement represents a betrayal of civic republican aspirations,
rather than a promise to achieve them.@246
The current reform movement, especially the choice/privatization wing, shares some of
these characteristics. As noted above, much of the justification for vouchers and other forms of
choice, emphasizes the Afailure@ of modern public education. O=Brien demonstrates that the
actual NAEP scores, the most widely available documentation of performance based on
standardized testing, shows that whites have stayed level and blacks have advanced over the last
quarter century.247 AWhat these scores demonstrate is that the >decline= witnessed in the last
twenty-five years is the decline of white academic advantage. Perhaps the rising chorus of
dissatisfaction with regard to academic standards reflects, in part, white majority concern over
losing that advantage.@248
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Id. at 373.

246

Id. at 374.

247

O=Brien, Private Schools, supra, note at 395-398. See National Center for Education
Statistics, Indicator 12, Trends in the Mathematics Performances of 9-,12- and 17-year olds,
positive for 1973-99, at 21, 24 ( reading performance higher for 9 and 13, same for 17, most of
the gain was in the 1970s). See also Rothstein, supra, note at 68-74.
248

O=Brien, supra, note at 396-7
90

James E. Ryan and Michael Heise analyze choice from a more positive perspective.249
Their thesis is that the failure of the choice movement to focus on suburban public school
stakeholders who are threatened by school choice dooms it much more than opposition by
teachers= unions or urban school bureaucracies.250 Just as school integration stopped at the
suburban lineBso too has choice. 251

249

See James E. Ryan and Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111
Yale L. J. 2043 (2002).
250

Suburban stakeholders are threatened by influx of outsiders and by potential loss of
revenue that could affect property values. Id. at 2045-46.
251

Id. at 2046;see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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Ryan and Heise consider choice to have Aradical potential@ which is being thwarted by
suburban resistance.252 They recognize though that the choice advocates do not sufficiently
attend to Athe connection between socioeconomic status and academic achievement [and]
[i]nstead . . . tend to place a great deal of faith in the power of competition to improve schools
generally and to boost academic achievement in particular.@253 Ryan and Heise question whether
school choice will inevitably produce overall gains.254

252

Id. at 2086. ASimply put, allowing students to choose freely among schools could
transform the way that education is provided in this country. To accept school choice in its most
aggressive and purest form is to accept the proposition that all students should be able to choose
from a range of schools. Further, if one believes that schools should really compete for students
Band compete fairlyBthen all students should have an equal opportunity to attend all schools. It
seems arbitrary to limit choice to a particular type of school, whether public or private, or to
schools in a particular geographic area. A robust school choice plan would give all students a
ticket good for entry at any school. Under these circumstances, students would have th widest
range of choices practicable, and school would have to compete on the basis of services provided
with similar resources. A universal school choice plan thus would undermine the rationales for
local control of public schools; local restrictions on attendance would be inconsistent with
allowing students to choose freely, and unequal expenditures among localities would be
inconsistent with requiring schools to maximize their efficiency by completing fairly with one
another.@ Id. .
253

Id. at 2112.

254

It may be that choice results in advantaged parents and students clustering in
particular schools, which would benefit those schools but do nothing for, or harm, less
advantaged schools. (Consider here the inequities among colleges and universities.) Put
differently, the same self-sorting that might increase family-level utility might simultaneously
decrease net social utility by reducing the socially optimal level of socioeconomic integration.
Local residents, in addition, might have less reason to care about local school quality because
residence would no longer determine school placement, and housing values and local school
quality would no longer be as tightly linked. Any competitive gains through choice might thus
be offset by losses from a reduction in monitoring by local residents.@ Id. at 2112-2113.
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We have already had a large and relatively unexamined experiment in privatizing
education which illustrates the challenges to the access and equity ignored by Chubb and Moe
and challenges the efficiency of the market in producing high quality education. In the 1980s the
federal student loan programs were largely deregulated leaving the recipientsBi.e. the
consumersBthe freedom to choose where to spend their education dollars. This led to an
explosion of trade schools of, to be charitable, varying quality.255 Many pegged their tuition to
the precise amount of financial aid and grants that low income students could qualify for and
many offered programs of very dubious valueBincluding security guard training and, my
personal favorite, a correspondence course to learn how to drive tractor-trailers.256 It would be
very enlightening to see if the deregulation and availability of individual choice led to more
quality programs and how well people disadvantaged by class and poverty were able to access
them. The lawyers most involved in trade school litigation say it had exactly the opposite
effectBpublic funds intended to help people out of poverty were drained off, leaving the students
with substantial and unaffordable debts and unable to obtain any more loans to attend more
legitimate programs.257

255

See, e.g. Rodriguez v. McKinney, 156 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Cathy Lesser
Mansfield, The Federal Trade Commission Holder Rule and Its Applicability to Student Loans:
Reallocating the Risk of Proprietary School Failure, 26 Wake Forest L. Rev. 635 (1991);
National Consumer Law Center, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES, &5.9 (3d ed.
1991 and supp. 1996).
256

See Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Federal Trade Commission Holder Rule and Its
applicability to Student LoansBReallocating the Risk of Propriety School Failure, 26 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 635 (1991).
257

Interview with Alan White, Community Legal Services, Inc., attorney for plaintiffs in
Rodriguez and other trade school fraud cases.
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The biggest contradiction between the rhetoric of empowerment and the actual
experience in Philadelphia is that the reform process imposed by Schweiker added no
empowerment at all to Philadelphia or its families. Philadelphia students already enjoyed the
right to transfer to another school if space was available so long as the requested transfer would
not have a segregating impact on either school.258 The takeover process disempowered
Philadelphia as a community; the changes in management of schools were imposed without input
or voice by the students and families affected.259 Parents were not even notified directly by the
SRC whether their schools were being considered for intervention until after the SRC made these
decisions.260 The SRC meetings, with one rare exception, were held during the middle of the
ordinary work dayBWednesday afternoons at 1 p. m.Band anyone who wished to testify had to
sign up in advance and provide written copies of their testimony. In a nutshell, the main reform
process offered neither voice nor choice to Philadelphia families.261
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See Part II, supra.

260

See Letter to Parents, supra, note .

261

See Liebman, supra, note .
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Who was empowered? The managerial class embodied in Edison and the other private
managers and state government forces supporting privatization of public
educationBdemonstrated by the state=s initial choice of Edison to evaluate Philadelphia, the
governor=s wholehearted and uncritical acceptance of Edison=s findings and its recommendation
that it run the entire Philadelphia School District,262 and the provision of extra funds to Edison
beyond what even the non-profit managers received to run the schools turned over to private
management; and the community groups and politicians who supported privatization, shown
most starkly through the independent schools grants program which rewarded these groups with
thousands of dollars.

262

See Casey Audit, supra, note for a detailed and harsh critique of the process by
which Edison was selected.
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The Pennsylvania statute that mandates state take over of failing schools is known as the
AEducation Empowerment Act.@263 The statute does not explicitly say who is intended to be
empowered but local school districts themselves are certainly not empowered by this law. The
Act directs the state department of education to place on the empowerment list any school
district with a Ahistory of low test performance.@264 A history of low test performance is defined
solely by PSSA test scores, specifically a combined average of 50% or more of the students
scoring in the bottom 25% or below basic level of performance on math and reading for the most
recent two years of scores.265 Extraordinarily low test performance is similarly defined solely in
reference to PSSA scores: 60% per cent in the bottom quartile or below basic for two years lands
a district in this category.266 School districts on the empowerment list must set up a Aschool
district empowerment team@ that will work with the Aacademic advisory team@ named by the
state department to develop a school improvement plan.267 If the district Adoes not meet the
goals for improving educational performance set forth in the school district improvement plan

263

24 P.S. ' 17-1701-B. Eugene Hickok, Secretary of Education in Pennsylvania under
Tom Ridge, stated: AThe Education Empowerment Act gives us a chance to help our schools that
need it most, using new models and new ideas to help failing school districts turn themselves
around. And, most important, it enables us to help our children success.@ Pa. Dept. of Ed. Press
Release, Dec. 4, 2000.
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and maintains a history of low test performance@ for three years, the state will take over the
district.268
The School District of Philadelphia was placed on the empowerment list in 2000 but was not
subject to takeover for academic distress at the time of the state takeover. Instead the takeover
was engineered by financial distress under a subsection of the statute aimed only at
Philadelphia.269
The Empowerment Act primarily empowered Governor Schweiker and Secretary Zogby
to force privatization on Philadelphia, allowing the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to literally
function as the family state in its starkest form.

268

1705-B.

269
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The sideshow to the main process, the independent schools grant program, crystallized
this conflict between the rhetoric of empowerment and the reality of lack of voice. The
Independent Schools Act270 is not a well known law. It is generally believed that this law grew
out of former Governor Ridge=s frustration at the barriers the charter school law places in the
way of converting existing public schools to charter schools. An existing school can be
converted only when half the staff and parents vote in favor of conversion.271 No existing public
school has been converted to a charter school since the law was enacted. The Independent
Schools Act contains no such barrier. A school district may designate Aany school of the district
as an independent school operating under an agreement with the board of school directors@ so
long as the school board agrees.272 The governing body of the independent school must include
Arepresentatives of parents and teachers@ but the number, percentage or even definition of such
representatives is not specified. 273 The agreement between the school board and the governing
body of the independent school determines everything from the governance structure to
funding.274 The employees remain school district employees and continue to be covered by
existing collective bargaining agreements275.
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The Act also provided for funding for grants to support conversion to independent school
status throughout Pennsylvania.276 In 2002, however, grants were awarded only for schools in
Philadelphia and only to groups that were closely and publically identified with Governor
Schweiker=s position on school reform.277 The Department of Education awarded $2 million in
grants for independent school conversion to seven groups in Philadelphia; the awards were
announced on April 9, 2002.278 No information appeared on the Department=s extensive website
about this grant program; there is no record that any Request for Proposals ever appeared there.
No grants were awarded for any schools outside of Philadelphia. One award recipient stated
publically that his group was made aware of the availability of the grants when they were
contacted by Department of Education officials suggesting that they apply.279
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As best as can be determined from the information available on the Department of
Education website, no other grants have ever been awarded under the Independent Schools Act
before or since April 2002.
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The granteesBGermantown Settlement, Universal Companies, Community
Connections Services and Development, Inc, Nueva Esperanza, Foundations, Inc., and the West
Philadelphia CoalitionBwere all involved in supporting Governor Schweiker=s effort to turn the
district over to Edison. The one exception was the Laboratory School of Communications and
Language, a charter school with exceptionally good test scores. The Laboratory School was
awarded one grant for Aa school to be determined.@ This grant might be the rare example of the
grant program functioning on merit but there is no public record of whether the grantee was ever
awarded a school or got the grant money.
279

Emanuel Freeman, CEO, Germantown Settlement, at May 14, 2002 community
forum. See Charing Ball, Settlement grilled over school study, management plans, Mt. Airy
Times- Express 1, 4, 6-7 (May 22, 2002 (on file with author).
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The contrast between the Department of Education and Governor=s press releases about
the program and the actual grant applications that were successful is quite remarkable. On
passage of the Act, Governor Ridge lauded the Act as among Asome of the most dramatic
education reforms Pennsylvania or the nation has ever seen . . . .@280 The Department=s Request
For Proposals for the grants, dated November 2001, but not publically available on the website,
stated that
Independent schools are an educational innovation based upon three ideas:
>A compelling, well-defined, well-rounded mission is established for the students.
>The freedom to achieve this mission is established through decreased central controls,
and the leadership of parents and teachers in prescribing the educational goals, the mission of the
school, and the curriculum to be offered.
> the school district transfers a portion of its authority to the governing body of an
independent school, so that the independent school may be primarily accountable to the
educational consumer for both the academic and fiscal goals of the independent school.281
The Request For Proposals goes on to provide the following evaluation criteria for award
of the grants:
Statement of anticipated mission and program overview of the independent school.
Identification of goals for the use of grant funds.
Identification of objectives and activities necessary for the achievement of each goal.
Description of expected results and time line for each activity.
A list of individuals involved in the development of the grant proposal, their addresses,
their affiliants and signatures.
Time line with completion dates to submit the independent school agreement to the
school board.282
The grants were awarded on a per-school basisB$25,000 per school proposed for
conversion, with payment split in two. Half the funds were to be provided when the grant
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contract was signed. The other half was to be furnished only when the grant recipient submitted
to the Department of Education an independent school agreement and a letter of intent to submit
the agreement to the school board.
In April 2002, Governor Schweiker proudly announced that seven community groups in
Philadelphia had been awarded $2 million in independent schools development grants Abased on
proposals that outlined individual school missionsBsuch as raising standards, improving student
performance and involving parents and the community in the schoolsBand how the organization
would achieve these goals.@283 The press release relied on those old favoritesBempowerment and
accountability-Aindependent schools are public schools governed by teachers and administrators
and parents who are empowered to make decisions about school operations, and who are held
accountable for fiscal and academic results.@284.
Germantown Settlement was one of the successful grant recipients. It received $425,000
in grants for 17 schools, including six schools that were named on the SRC partnership list. 285
This left Germantown Settlement with $150,000 in grants to convert six schools to a status which
the SRC had already explicitly rejected.
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Pa. Dept. of Ed. Press release, April 7, 2002.
Id.
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The two lists designated conflicting treatment for these schoolsBthe SRC determined
that three would be reconstituted (Emlen, Steel and Roosevelt) and one, Fulton, was assigned to
Foundations, Inc. for private management. The remaining two, Pickett and Logan, were
originally designated by the SRC to become independent schools but at the end of May, the SRC,
after considering and rejecting proposals from Germantown Settlement itself and two other
community groups to run Logan and Pickett, decided not to use the independent school model
after all. Instead it designated Logan for reconstitution and Pickett for private management.
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What were the individual missions outlined by Germantown Settlement for these schools
that would empower their parents and teachers to run them and which so convinced the
Department of Education to provide this money? Interestingly, Germantown Settlement filed
identical grant applications for all 17 schools. The only difference among them was the name
and address of the school. No individualized mission was outlined. Each grant application
identified the mission of the school as:
To help low and moderate income students in grades K-12 to reach world
class standards of academic excellence within an active learning context, promote
social and cultural growth, prepare young people for leadership roles within their
community and the national, and model effective educational approaches.
The application further identified the education model to be used as:
The Settlement=s model includes the following components: social
supportive services, community planning and organizing, resident engagement,
and physical and economic development. Our model requires that education
programming for youth be integrated with community development; and
conversely, that community development support the growth and education of
children.
The Settlement believes that Philadelphia=s education model of yesterday
is lest[sic] effective as a model to respond to the child and family poverty
indicators specific to the Charles Henry [one of the 17 schools] and the
surrounding community of today. These indicators form the nexus of the
challenges faced by students and their families. In proposing to establish and
implement independent schools, The Settlement will work with key stakeholders,
utilizing existing resources within the community and the school, to help to
mitigate these challenges. Through the efforts of the Germantown Community
Collaborative Board (GCCB) and the Wister Neighborhood Council (WNC), we
will work to increase personal commitment and the leadership of residents to
serve as catalysts to facilitate positive solutions. Our short-term goals are to:
1)develop a planning infrastructure; 2)offer on-site activity and services;
3)increase resident and community ownership; 4)increase school employee
ownership; and 5) facilitate coordination of local institutional resources.286
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Grant proposal, on file with author (emphasis supplied).
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It is all too easy to poke fun at another field=s jargon, but it is hard to resist wondering exactly
what Aon-site activity@ was worth $425,000 to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Nowhere in
the grant application were these terms or proposals explained more specifically.

This process glaringly demonstrated the lack of empowerment of the communities of the
targeted schools. Neither the Department of Education nor Germantown Settlement bothered to
communicate with any of the targeted schools before seeking or awarding the grants. Indeed the
C.W. Henry school staff and parents learned their fate by reading a newspaper article that listed
the schools and the grant recipients.287 Carol Nejman, Henry=s principal, first assumed that
Henry=s inclusion on the list was a mistake because the school=s test scores ranked near the top of
Philadelphia elementary schools. But, as she and the other schools quickly learned, the grant
awards had nothing to do with school performance. Indeed Central High School, Philadelphia=s
much lauded academic magnet high school, was the subject of an independent school grant
awarded to Foundations, Inc. in the same process.288 The schools targeted in the grant proposals
were all over the city and range from the elite to the struggling. They had little in common other
than their appeal to groups that Schweiker wished to reward. Germantown Settlement apparently
sought schools within the Northwest area and included schools ranging from large
287

Interview, Carol Nejman, principal of C.W. Henry, 2001-2002,.
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Central is the second oldest public high school in the United States. It has the second
highest test scores of any public high school in Philadelphia, second only to the other academic
magnet school, Julia Masterman. Its scores far surpass the state medians. Central regularly
sends significant numbers of graduates to elite colleges. For example, members of its 2002
graduating class enrolled at Yale, Princeton, University of Chicago, Brown, Penn, Columbia,
Duke, Stanford, Swarthmore, University of California at Berkeley, Curtis Institute of Music, and
other elite colleges. See <http://centralhigh.net/alumni/collegeattendance/261college.html>
(accessed Sept. 16, 2003).
.
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comprehensive high schools like Roxborough High Schooland Germantown High School to a
variety of elementary schools to the regional magnet school for severely disabled children,
Widener Memorial. Several of the schoolsBAMY_NW, Emlen, Lingelbach and HenryBwere
members of a loose coalition of schools in the Mt Airy neighborhood of Philadelphia that were
all working with the Coalition of Essential Schools289 The news that they were targeted for
conversion to independent status by an entity they had had no contact with was very disturbing.
What upset the targeted school communities most was the governance structure proposed
by Germantown Settlement which did not in any way Aempower@ parents or teachers. In
contrast to the enthusiastic words of Governor Schweiker, describing an independent school as
governed by parents and teachers, Germantown Settlement proposed to set up a non-profit
corporation that it would control which would then have full authority over school operations.
Specifically, the grant proposal accepted by the Department of Education stated:
The Independent school proposed herein will be managed by a separate
entity to be entitled, Northwest Education Development Corporation (NEDC).
This entity . . . shall have full responsibility for the following tasks:
Establish all policies governing the school . . .
Shall hire and fire all personnel
Shall enter into all professional service contracts on behalf of the school
Shall establish and maintain an active resident and parent advisory
committee and promote participation in program aspects of the operations of the
school.
Approve an annual operating budget . .
Responsible for school facilities, including maintenance, safety and
operations.
The governance structure will consist of a total of five (5) members to be
appointed as follows:
Three members shall be appointed by Germantown Settlement (one such
appointee shall serve as the President of the Board of Directors)
One member shall be appointed by the Germantown Settlement Charter
289

The Coalition of Essential Schools has a website at
<www.essentialschools.org/pub/ces_docs/about/about.html> (accessed Sept. 16, 2003).
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School, and
One member shall be elected by the appointed members.290
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Germantown Settlement, Grant Proposal for the conversion of C.W. Henry School (on
file with author).
105

The proposal also contained several strong hints that not only would Germantown
Settlement control the school through the NEDC, the NEDC in turn would employ a private
manager to actually run the school. The proposal states, AIt is envisioned that NEDC will
function under a contract with the School Reform Commission (SRC). Under this agreement,
NEDC will handle the day-to-day operations of the school via professional service contracts with
various entities to be identified through the course of the planning process.@ 291 The
organizational chart illustrating the governance structure that was attached to the grant proposal
contained a box for an Educational Management Organization, SRC jargon for a private forprofit manager like Edison Schools, Inc.
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The news that their schools might be taken over by a community group with little
experience in education created quite a stir in a community known for activism. Over 200
people signed a petition, presented to Governor Schweiker and Secretary Zogby, that demanded
use of the grant funds for school needs and not for take overs.292 Parents organized a community
forum in May 2002 that was attended by an estimated 250 people who pelted questions at
Germantown Settlement=s representatives about what they intended to do.293 Germantown
Settlement CEO, Emanuel Freeman, insisted that no take over was intended and that NEDC was
just a conceptual model. He did stress though that Germantown Settlement intended to set up
NEDC and to proceed with its assessments though it promised to respect the decisions of
individual schools that chose not to become independent. Parents quickly found out exactly
what this commitment meant. The C.W. Henry school had its own school meeting in early June
where the parents, teachers and staff discussed the situation and unanimously decided to tell
Germantown Settlement that they declined to seek independent status and wished to continue
working on reforms under the Coalition for Essential Schools model as a public school.294 On
June 10, 2002, a letter signed by Principal Nejman, Assistant Principal Karen Dean, PFT
Building Representative Cred Dobson, School Council Representative Yvonne ThompsonFriend and Home and School President Elayne Bender, was sent to Mr. Freeman at Germantown
Settlement advising him that the C.W. Henry community did not want to participant in any
conversion to independent status with Germantown Settlement. The letter asked that
292

A copy of the petition is on file with author.
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See Mt Airy Times- Express, supra, note .
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Letter to Emanuel Freeman and Cornelia Swinson, June 10, 2002; letter to Charles
Zogby, June 10, 2002. (Copies on file with author).
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Germantown Settlement confirm in writing that it would not proceed with plans for conversion
and would not submit a draft conversion contract to the Department of Education. Neither
Germantown Settlement nor Governor Schweiker nor Secretary Zogby acknowledged or
responded to this letter. In September 2002, Germantown Settlement submitted its assessment to
the Department of Education, complete with a proposed contract that provided for full control of
the school by Germantown Settlement.295
It is illuminating to compare the records of the schools subjected to this process with the
record of the entities that the Department of Education entrusted with the public=s money.
Germantown Settlement representatives acknowledged that they had little background in
education. Its primary involvement in education is the establishment and operation of the
Germantown Settlement Charter School (GSCS). The GSCS, established in 1999, includes
grades 5-8 and enrolled 520 students in 2000-2001.296 Its test scores are abysmal. The vast
majority of its students landed in the lowest categoryBbelow basicBin the two years of testing
available at the time the grants were awarded. In 2001, 86% of its fifth graders scored in below
basic in math, 66% in reading; 88% of the eighth graders scored below basic in math and 64% in
reading.297 The much maligned Philadelphia school district average in these categories were, for
fifth grade, 57% math, 59% reading; for eighth grade 63% math and 52 % reading. The schools
that Germantown Settlement sought to control had much better test scores; only the few that
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The school profiles, including PSSA results, are available at
<www.paprofiles.org/pa2001/Philadelphia.html#126515001> (accessed Sept. 16, 2003).
108

were on the SRC partnership list even approached GSCS=s low scores.298. The GSCS scores
would have squarely placed the school on the reform list of the SRC Bif charter schools were
subject to the same standard of evaluation as traditional public schools.
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The Department of Education website continued to be silent on the status of the
Independent Schools grants throughout 2002. Germantown Settlement filed its assessments, late,
in September 2002, and, presumably, received the second half of the grant award funds before
Secretary Zogby resigned. Germantown Settlement sent a copy of the assessment, dated
September 2002, for C.W. Henry to the school on Oct. 15, 2002. Principal Nejman compared
notes with the principals at the other targeted schools and all had, again, received identical
documents. The assessment was rife with inaccuracies and vague conclusions. From the
Executive Summary, it appears that Germantown Settlement submitted assessments for Simon
Gratz High School and Edward T. Steel Elementary even though its initial grants for these
schools had been transferred to Joseph E. Hill/Samson and Prince Hall Schools.299 I have not
had access to the other documents which are not publically available. The Germantown
Settlement story illustrates Schweiker and Zogby=s willingness to force Achoice@ and
Aindependence@ onto schools, students, and parents even when they had no interest or desire for it
and actively opposed it. The empowerment of this story was for the managerial class represented
by the would-be manager Germantown Settlement, not the parents or students of the schools at
issue.
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Germantown Settlement Assessment of Charles W. Henry School, Executive
Summary at 1(listing schools for which it received grants); Letter of September 20, 2002 from J.
Terry Kostoff, Depute Auditor General for Audits, Department of the Auditor General of
Pennsylvania, advising that the Germantown Settlement grants for Gratz and Steel were replaced
by Hill/Samson and Prince Hall schools. (copies on file with author).
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V.

Conclusion
The Philadelphia public schools are not as Agood@ as some of the better-funded suburban

public schools when you compare quality and age of buildings, extent of teacher credentials,
high school drop out rates, or standardized-test scores.300 It would take another article to try to
define what a Agood@ school is and whether these are the right criteria to determine it. But any
definition has to consider the economics and equities of school funding and has to consider the
challenges the students bring with them. A district where the bulk of the children are living
below the poverty line has a harder job than a district where the vast majority come from
privileged homes where formal education is fully supported from birth. Philadelphia=s children
will present their challenges to any school they go toBwhether public, public charter, privately
managed, or traditional private school. However, the aspirational ideal to provide a decent
public education to all of our children is one of the key bases to our collective image of the
United States as an egalitarian democracy. Before we take more steps to eliminate the public
school system, we need to recognize the challenges it faces and we need to recognize its value
and role as an institution even where parts of that institution need improvement.
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See Kohn, supra, note ; Kozol, supra, note .
111

Perhaps I will be viewed as extreme in thinking that the reformers I have looked at here
want to end public education. It is also beyond the scope of this article to analyze thoroughly
how the requirements more than the rhetoric of No Child Left Behind,301 the mania for highstakes testing, and the growing individualist attitude towards education are putting public
education at serious risk. But the rhetoric of the reformers, both in their double standard for
charter and private schools and their characterization of public schools, illuminates the goals they
seek. The current United States Education Secretary, Ronald Paige, recently praised the
superiority of Christian schools, saying A[t]he reason that Christian schools and Christian
universities are growing is a result of a strong value system. . . .In a religious environment the
value system is set. That=s not the case in a public school, where there are so many different kids
with different kinds of values.@ 302 AAll things equal, I would prefer to have a child in a school
that has a strong appreciation for the values of the Christian community, where a child is taught
to have a strong faith. Where a child is taught that, there is a source of strength greater than
themselves.@303 Charles Zogby, the former Pennsylvania Commonwealth Secretary of
Education, made no secret of his preference for and commitment to privatizing public education.
After Rendell=s election as governor, Zogby resigned and became the Senior Vice President of
Education and Policy for K12, Inc., a company devoted to providing private management for
301

The name of this law is itself cynicalBas its effect is the opposite of what the name
purports. More and more children are getting letters mandated by No Child Left Behind advising
them that their schools are failing and that they have a right to transferBto other schools that are
overcrowded, unable, or unwilling to take them. See infra at . As No Child Left Behind=s
sanctions on these schools kick in, the thousands of children enrolled in them will indeed be Aleft
behind@ in the most real sense.
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public schools and to providing a curriculum for homeschooling.304 The No Child Left Behind
Act states that its purpose will be accomplished by Aproviding alternatives to students in [failing]
schools.@305 The Empowerment Act requires that the improvement plans of schools placed on
the empowerment list include school choice.306
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K12, Inc. describes itself on its website as:

K12 is an education company led by William J. Bennett, the former U.S. Secretary of Education,
editor of The Book of Virtues, and author of The Educated Child. K12 is building a
comprehensive, standards-based curriculum and learning program. We work with educators and
parents across the nation, utilizing traditional materials and the latest technology to deliver our
excellent academic program. K12 is not a school; it is a company that provides a research-based
curriculum, innovative instructional tools, and top-quality school management services to
schools across America. K12 also serves homeschooling families by making a portion of its
curriculum available for direct purchase by consumers.
http://www.k12.com/about/company.html (accessed August 22, 2003)
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The point of privatization, according to Chubb and Moe, was to let the market,
through empowered parents as consumers, determine whether schools live or die. The
Philadelphia reform process in 2001-2002 was largely an anti-choice reform. It brought
Philadelphia parents privatization without consent or choice. Philadelphia students and
parents were not consulted, were not listened to, and were not even told in advance what
reforms were being instituted in their schools. Although parents continue to have the
right to seek a transfer for their children, nothing in the reform process gave the parents
any more effective information to guide that choice. Philadelphia has not benefitted from
the efficiency that Chubb and Moe promised. Its privately managed schools cost more,
not less, to run and threaten the resources of the remaining schools. There will be no
voting with parental feetBbecause parental choice is not part of this picture. Zogby got to
choose and he chose Edison.307
Why does the rhetoric of failure, accountability, and empowerment work to
persuade? One could cogently argue that it has not. There has been enormous and
fervent opposition in Philadelphia to the edicts of the state.308 But my focus here is those
who have been persuaded and on those doing the persuading. Gutmann=s consideration
of vouchers, the other darling of Achoice,@is illuminating:
The appeal of vouchers to many Americans who are not otherwise
committed to a state of families stems, I suspect, from three facts. One is
307

I must note though that Secretary Zogby did not get his full choice
eitherBEdison got a large chunk of the Philadelphia School District but they did not get
the entire thing, thanks to a fervent and hard-fought campaign by many Philadelphia
students, parents, community members, educators and school staffs.
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The fight throughout the fall of 2001 by the students, parents, teachers,
employees and other concerned citizens, right up to Mayor Street at one point, helped
block Governor Schweiker from effecting his original plan of turning management of the
entire district over to Edison.
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that our public schools, especially in many of our largest cities, are so
centralized and bureaucratized that parents along with other citizens
actually exercise very little democratic control over local schools. The
second is that only poor parents lack the option of exiting from public
schools, and this seems unfair. The third, and most sweeping fact, is that
the condition of many public schools today is bleak by any commonsensical standard of what democratic education ought to be.
The proper response to the first problem is to make public school
systems less bureaucratic and more democratic. The best response to the
second problem is to redistribute income more equitably, which would
also overcome many other inequities in the ability of citizens to make use
of their freedoms Were private schooling an essential welfare good like
health care, then the case for directly subsidizing it would be stronger.
But we have already argued that public, not private schooling is an
essential welfare good for children as well as the primary means by which
citizens can morally educate future citizens. We have yet to consider
whether (and why) , given the democratic purposes of education, a
democratic society should leave room for private schooling. But based on
our considerations so far, we can conclude that the welfare of children and
the well-being of democracy can be supported simultaneously by
improving education, especially moral education within public schools
rather than by encouraging parents to exit from them. We need not deny
the third problemBthat the condition of many public schools today is
bleakBto recognize that we know of no more effective way, nor is there a
more consistently democratic way, of trying to develop democratic
character than to improve public schooling. 309
I maintain that Gutmann is rightBprivate choice, whether in the form of vouchers or charters or
an illusory right to transfer to a Asuccessful@ school--is not the democratic solution. It entails running
away and avoiding our differences. It deprives us of the social capital created by all of our children
learning together. It undermines our collective responsibility to all our children. It has made us devalue
the essential good of a system that brings all children together to create community out of difference.
And running away is largely what has undercut the public school system in the first place and brought us
the real problems it faces.310
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It is not my point here to say which reform to use. I just aim to be clear about what has been
done, and to ask for fairness in how students and schools are being evaluated; to ask for honesty about
the standards that are used; and to ask the law makers of these reform to be at least as precise in
language as new lawyers are expected to be.
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